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ABSTRACT
Current scaling trends in transistor technology, in pursuit of larger component counts
and improving power efficiency, are making the hardware increasingly less reliable. Due
to extreme transistor miniaturization, it is becoming easier to flip a bit stored in memory
elements built using these transistors. Given that soft errors can cause transient bit-flips in
memory elements, caused due to alpha particles and cosmic rays striking those elements,
soft errors have become one of the major impediments in system resilience as we move
towards exascale computing.
Soft errors escaping the hardware-layer may silently corrupt the runtime application
data of a program, causing silent data corruption in the output. Also, given that soft
errors are transient in nature, it is notoriously hard to trace back their origins. Therefore,
techniques to enhance system resilience hinge on the availability of efficient error detectors
that have high detection rates, low false positive rates, and lower computational overhead.
It is equally important to have a flexible infrastructure capable of simulating realistic soft
error models to promote an effective evaluation of newly developed error detectors.
In this work, we present a set of techniques for efficiently detecting soft errors affecting
control-flow, data, and structured address computations in an application. We evaluate
the efficacy of the proposed techniques by evaluating them on a collection of benchmarks
through fault-injection driven studies. As an important requirement, we also introduce
two new LLVM-based fault injectors, KULFI and VULFI, which are geared towards scalar
and vector architectures, respectively. Through this work, we aim to make contributions
to the system resilience community by making our research tools (in the form of error
detectors and fault injectors) publicly available.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
High-performance computing (HPC) applications will soon be running at very high
scales on systems with large component counts. The shrinking dimensions and reducing
power requirements of the transistors used in the memory elements of these massively
parallel systems make them increasingly vulnerable to temporary bit-flips induced by
system noise or high-energy particle strikes. The transient bit-flips occurring in memory
elements are often referred to as soft errors (also called single-event-upsets). Soft errors are
one of the gravest of impediments to the rapid attainment of large-scale (especially exas-
cale) computing capabilities [65,86,89]. Such errors are typically caused by radiation from
chip packaging, cosmic rays [45,91], or even circuit noise due to low-power operation [15].
May et al. reported one of the earliest accounts about the presence of soft errors in 1979
when they witnessed single-bit error in dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) due to
alpha particles [62]. They attributed the alpha particle strikes to radioactive contamination
in packaging materials. A much later study done by Michalak et al. [65] reported evidence
of soft errors affecting ASC Q supercomputer’s onboard static random-access memory
(SRAM) cache lines. The onboard cache was not protected using error-correcting code
(ECC), and was only capable of detecting errors with an odd number of bits by using
an additional parity bit per cache line. The authors were able to validate their hypothesis
that the errors reported by the parity-bit detectors were due to soft errors caused by cosmic
rays.
Recent studies project an upward trend in soft-error-induced vulnerabilities in HPC
systems, thereby pushing down their mean time to failure (MTTF) [18, 19]. These studies
have also highlighted that soft-error-rate (SER) in storage elements such as central pro-
cessing unit (CPU) register files, cache memory, and DRAM are expected to rise in the
future due to aggressive feature scaling and constant demand for power-efficient architec-
tures. These trends drastically increase the likelihood of a bit-flip occurring in long-lived
2computations. A bit-flip affecting computational states of a program under execution
such as arithmetic and logical unit (ALU) operations or live register values may lead to a
silent data corruption (SDC) in the final program output. Making the matter worse, such
erroneous values may propagate to multiple compute nodes in massively parallel HPC
systems [6]. Also, due to the transient nature of soft errors, they are notoriously difficult
to trace back and it is equally difficult to precisely predict their occurrence rate for a given
hardware component [67]. Therefore, researchers are actively working on finding new
ways to accurately estimate soft-error-rate (SER) [56,71]. These facts highlight the need for
developing proactive strategies to provide sufficient coverage for detecting and correcting
soft errors.
1.1 A Cross-Layer Approach to System Resilience
Apparently, soft errors have already been identified as one of the key challenges to
system resilience as we transition to exascale computing. While additional or hardened
hardware circuitry can prevent the onset of failures or detect them early in the stack, with
the ever increasing push for power-efficient architectures, cross-layer resilience solutions
(as highlighted in Figure 1.1) that encompass all of the hardware and software stacks, are
Figure 1.1: A cross-layer approach to system resilience
3essential to be developed [18, 19, 25].
Given that resilience solutions typically incur a net drop in performance, it is critical
that the research community develops and makes available a whole array of solutions
that can then be evaluated over a sufficient period by practitioners, so that the right
combinations of solutions that minimize overheads may be chosen. Studies [87] indicate
that efficient software-level error detectors are necessary to reduce the use of the ’always
on’ hardware-level checkers that can exacerbate energy consumption.
We now list some of the key resilience solutions which are employed across different
layers of a system.
1. Hardware-level techniques: Selective hardening techniques such as Triple Modulo
Redundancy (TMR), SECDED, and Chip-Kill are employed to protect critical hard-
ware elements. Identification of critical elements is made using vulnerability analy-
sis such as Architecture Vulnerability Factor (AVF) proposed by Mukherjee et al. [68].
Hardware-only protection mechanisms are cost sensitive and are often limited by
budgetary constraints. Therefore, cross-layer resilience solutions are envisaged as
the way forward.
2. Compiler-level techniques: Compiler-level techniques often involve selective du-
plication of instructions. Considerable research has been done at the compiler layer
to automatically identify vulnerable code regions which are then used to guide place-
ment of the detectors [38, 60, 75, 77, 92].
3. Checkpointing: The method of checkpointing requires saving application states
at regular intervals to an array of disks such as redundant array of independent
disks (RAID). In the event of failures, the checkpointed data is used to restore the
execution context to the last known good condition. The frequency of checkpointing
is often guided by the estimated MTTF of the underlying system [17, 19]. Due to
the associated performance and space overhead with this approach, determining an
optimal frequency for checkpointing and reducing the size of the checkpointing data
are the actively researched areas.
4. Algorithm-based Fault Tolerance (ABFT): Techniques falling under this category
exploit algorithmic properties of a program to detect the presence of soft errors
during its execution, for example, maintaining checksum of rows and columns data
of matrices used in a matrix-matrix multiplication [34] and using the checksum to
4detect single-bit errors.
5. Control-Flow Protection: Soft errors inducing control-flow deviations may cause
SDC in a program’s final output. Therefore, a separate line of research has focused
on extracting efficient control-flow signatures to detect illegal control-flow devia-
tions caused due to soft errors [14, 50, 72, 80, 96, 106, 107].
1.2 Evaluation of Resilience Solutions
Developing a robust evaluation infrastructure capable of simulating realistic error mod-
els is an essential requirement for evaluating any resilience solution. For example, a recent
study by Cher et al. uses hardware-level proton irradiation as well as software-level fault
injections to assess fault tolerance capability of BlueGene/Q supercomputers against soft
errors [26]. Similarly, Fang et al. have developed an LLVM-level fault injector and they
present a fault injection driven study to assess resiliency of OpenMP programs against
soft errors [36]. Another study, done by Hari et al., involves performing fault injections
using a microarchitectural simulator to find those application fault sites which lead to
silent data corruption. One of the key focus of their study is to find a minimal set of repre-
sentative fault sites which can be used to characterize the resiliency of an application [43].
The underlying importance of a flexible and efficient fault injection framework lead our
development efforts towards designing fault injectors for scalar and vector architectures.
1.3 Thesis Contributions and Organization
1.3.1 Fault Injectors for Scalar and Vector Architectures
The previous section highlighted the need for having a flexible and effective evalu-
ation infrastructure. To this goal, we have developed two instruction-level fault injec-
tors, KULFI and VULFI, which are targeted for scalar and vector architectures, respec-
tively [95,96]. Chapter 2 details the design and workflow of these error injectors including
their fault site selection and fault injection algorithms.
1.3.2 Control-Flow Detectors Using Predicate-Abstraction
The next contribution of this dissertation work (described in Chapter 3) is a novel
control-flow error detector capable of detecting control-flow deviations induced by bit-
flips [96]. Using a well-known formal technique called predication-abstraction [8, 28, 42],
5our technique identifies a set of valid predicate transitions through dynamic profiling
which are then used as error detectors.
1.3.3 Automated Synthesis of Predicate Transitions-based Detectors
Chapter 3 also introduces our third key contribution in the form of a tool called FUSED
which automates the process of profiling predicate transitions in a target program and in-
serting the error detectors, built using these transitions, back into the target program [98].
1.3.4 Control-Flow Detectors for Vector Loops
Chapter 3 also describes in detail our fourth contribution as another set of control-flow
detectors targeting vector loops [95] generated by Intel’s ISPC compiler [3,81]. This work
introduces a novel approach for analyzing code generation strategy adopted by the ISPC
compiler to infer compiler-level invariants which are then used for error detection.
1.3.5 Building Error Detectors for Stencil Computations
Our earlier work on control-flow detectors raised our curiosity to explore the feasibility
of lightweight detectors for applications which are not rich in control-flow. Chapter 4
presents an exploratory work which presents a feasibility study on building low overhead
detectors for stencil computations [93]. Stencil computations usually have high arithmetic
intensity with a low count of control predicates. We present a systematic approach to
extract a lightweight approximate kernel for a target stencil kernel using machine learning,
run the approximate kernel alongside the main kernel, and compare their results to detect
errors. Chapter 4 shares the finding of the feasibility study and makes key recommenda-
tions for building effective detectors for stencil computations.
1.3.6 Protecting Structured Address Computations
Our last key contribution (also our most recent work), presented in Chapter 5, proposes
a compiler-level technique to protect structured address computations [94]. Unfortu-
nately, efficient detectors to detect faults during address generation (to index large arrays)
have not been widely researched. We present a novel lightweight compiler-driven tech-
nique called PRESAGE for detecting bit-flips affecting structured address computations.
A key insight underlying PRESAGE is that any address computation scheme that flows
an already incurred error is better than a scheme that corrupts one particular array access
6but otherwise (falsely) appears to compute perfectly. Flowing errors allows one to situate
detectors at loop exit-points, and helps turn silent corruptions into easily detectable error
situations. Our experiments using PolyBench benchmark suite indicate that PRESAGE-
based error detectors have a high error-detection rate and incur low overheads.
1.4 Thesis Statement
The previous section summarizes our unique contributions which revolve around an-
alyzing a program’s properties such as control predicates, code generation pattern in the
case of vector compilers, the structure of a stencil computation for learning approximate
kernels, and structured address computation logic at compiler-level, to build efficient
error detectors. The evaluation of these techniques is possible due to the fault injectors
developed as part of work. Therefore, we describe our thesis statement as follows:
Analyzing program properties at the application and intermediate representa-
tion levels to develop lightweight and efficient error detection techniques, and
evaluating the efficacy of these techniques using a flexible and robust fault
injection infrastructure driven towards improving system resilience.
1.5 Multiple Authors Release Statement
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author-release forms signed by the coauthors listed above, granting me the permission to
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CHAPTER 2
BUILDING A FLEXIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR
SOFT ERROR SIMULATIONS
2.1 Introduction
Having a flexible and robust infrastructure capable of simulating various soft error
scenarios is a necessary and essential prerequisite for evaluating any new resilience solu-
tion. Unfortunately, we could not find any publicly available compiler-level fault injector
when we initially started our resilience research. Therefore, to this goal, we developed
two instruction-level fault injectors named KULFI and VULFI. Both of these injectors are
developed using LLVM compiler infrastructure [55, 58] and they perform fault injections
at LLVM intermediate representation (IR) level. Our initial effort led to the development
of KULFI (Kontrollable Utah’s LLVM-based Fault Injector) which supports injecting faults
in LLVM instructions which are of scalar type. As the focus of our research shifted more
towards HPC domain where programs are often subjected to vectorization, we devel-
oped VULFI (Vectorized Utah’s LLVM-based Fault Injector) to handle vector instructions.
Specifically, VULFI is capable of targeting both vector and scalar instructions thereby
subsuming KULFI, and currently supports languages such as C, C++, ISPC, and OpenCL.
Moreover, VULFI’s modular software design makes it much easier to implement new
error models. This chapter explains salient features of both KULFI and VULFI tools, detail-
ing their designs, workflows, and demonstrating their effectiveness through experimental
evaluations.
2.2 Error Models
On a broader level, the various error models considered in this dissertation work share
a common error scenario where soft errors induce a single-bit fault affecting CPU register
files and ALU operations. We assume DRAM and cache memory to be error-free, which
8is a reasonable assumption as they are often protected using ECC mechanism [23, 51, 52,
100]. The aforementioned error scenario is implemented by targeting runtime instances of
LLVM IR-level instructions of a target program for fault injections. For example, if there
are N dynamic IR-level instructions observed corresponding to a target program, then we
choose one out of N dynamic instructions with a uniform random probability of 1N . After
that, we flip the value of a randomly selected bit of the destination virtual register, i.e.,
the l.h.s. of the randomly chosen dynamic instruction. We call each dynamic instruction a
dynamic fault site, and the respective static instruction a static fault site. Both KULFI and
VULFI support various fault site selection strategies, e.g., selecting only those fault sites
which pertain to pointer arithmetic.
2.3 Classifying Outcomes of Fault Injections
Classifying the result of a fault injection performed on a target program requires com-
paring the output produced by the faulty execution with that of a fault-free execution
such that both runs are carried out using the same set of test inputs. During the faulty
execution, a single-bit fault is injected into a randomly chosen dynamic instruction as
explained earlier. Both KULFI and VULFI classify the outcome of the faulty execution
into one of the following categories by comparing its output with that of the fault-free
execution:
1. Silent Data Corruption (SDC) : When the result of the faulty execution differs from
that of the fault-free execution.
2. Benign : When no difference is observed between the executions.
3. Program-crash/Segmentation Fault : When the faulty execution results in a system
failure, a program-crash, or any other issue that could easily be detected by the end
user.
2.4 KULFI: A Fault Injector Targeting Scalar Instructions
KULFI is capable of injecting dynamic faults into programs written in C. A dynamic
fault emulates a transient fault induced by soft errors, and is injected into a fault site
selected during program execution. KULFI injects a single-bit fault into a data or a pointer
register by flipping a randomly chosen bit in the live register value. It provides fine-
grained control over the fault injection process by allowing a user to specify fault injection
9probability, injected byte location, fault site type (data, pointer), etc. Figure 2.1 shows the
flowchart of the dynamic fault injection done by KULFI. At a high level, the fault injection
loop goes through all dynamic instructions. For each dynamic instruction, the fault type to
be injected is selected as either data or pointer type. Subsequently, KULFI checks whether
it is feasible to inject a fault with the chosen fault type into the selected instruction. If
this test passes and the provided fault injection probability is met, then a fault is injected
into the instruction. We repeat these steps for all dynamic instructions. Once the loop is
finished going through all the dynamic instructions, the execution of KULFI terminates.
Figure 2.2 illustrates a transient fault occurring at register level. The shown register does
not contain a fault at time t1. At time t2, a fault occurs, and then it disappears at time
t3. Dynamic fault injection capability of KULFI models such transient fault behavior.
KULFI operates on the LLVM intermediate representation (IR) level (i.e., LLVM bitcode
level) in the static single assignment (SSA) form. SSA ensures that every IR variable (i.e.,
logical register) is assigned only once, which is an advantage as opposed to operating at
the source code level when modeling transient faults. More specifically, injecting a fault
into an SSA logical register referenced by an instruction is a one-time occurrence affecting
only the instructions that use that logical register. SSA naturally prevents references to
the same source code variable in the later instructions from observing the injected fault.
Note that the duration for which a transient fault persists in an actual hardware register
varies. Therefore, it is possible that more than one instruction could get affected by a single
transient fault. Currently, we do not capture such timing-related behaviors of transient
faults in the software emulation of faults done by KULFI. However, KULFI still provides
a reasonable model of transient fault behaviors, and similar models were adopted by other
error injectors [31, 59].
2.5 Evaluation of KULFI
For evaluating KULFI, we carry out an empirical case study that assesses the resilience
of several popular sorting algorithms. Previous work suggests that algorithms and data
structures that solve a particular problem not only vary in time and space complexity, but
also in how resilient they are to faults [40]. In that line of work, a memory (i.e., DRAM)
error model is assumed to study the resilience of sorting algorithms [39]. However, the
memory error model is often too restrictive since it fails to cover classes of faults not
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Figure 2.1: Flowchart showing dynamic fault injection in KULFI
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Figure 2.2: A transient fault occurring in a register
directly tied to memory, such as register corruptions, control-flow corruptions, and in-
correct computation, which are prevalent in real-world systems. In our empirical study,
we choose to use a more descriptive error model supported in KULFI. The selected error
model considers all instructions of a program as candidate fault occurrence locations,
including memory reads and writes, register operations, and control-flow instructions.
In our case study, we consider implementations of five well-known sorting algorithms:
BubbleSort (with preemptive termination criterion), RadixSort, QuickSort, MergeSort, and
HeapSort.1 All implementations take as input an array of integers to be sorted, and they
output the sorted array. In this study, we do not bias on the size and input data, i.e.,
the arrays are of arbitrary size (between 2000 and 10000) and contain random integer
data. We perform a fault injection campaign for each sorting algorithm implementation
using KULFI. Each fault injection campaign consists of 200 fault injection experiments. A
single fault injection experiment comprises 100 executions of an algorithm. Therefore,
each algorithm is executed a total of 20000 times, which we split into 200 fault injection
experiments so that we can later compute the statistical significance of our results. In each
execution, the algorithm operates on a different randomly generated input array, while a
single random bit-flip error is injected at runtime using KULFI. We describe the details of
our fault injection strategy next.
2.5.1 Execution Strategy
Even with a fault injector such as KULFI available, selecting a realistic fault injection
probability requires careful planning; we now present our approach in this regard. Fault
filtration naturally occurs across the hardware/software stack where many faults fall into
1Source code of the examples and scripts for performing the experiments are also available from the KULFI
website.
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the ”don’t-care” sets of the higher layers. Specifically, Sanda et al. [91] report how an IBM
POWER6 processor was bombarded with protons and alpha particles within an elaborate
experimental setup. The authors estimated that the percentage of faults that reached the
application logic was 0.2% of the overall number of latch-level faults. While this approach
to fault simulation is quite realistic, such a ”bottom-up” fault injection approach (and its
infrastructural overheads) is clearly out of reach for most researchers. On the other hand,
there are some recent approaches targeting software-level resilience-enhancing mecha-
nisms Therefore, we decided to focus our empirical study only on the effects of faults that
do reach the application logic since those are of particular interest to the software-level re-
silience community. We still had to devise a reasonable and fair fault injection probability.
Given the above discussion, we now define additional notions that help us elaborate
our studies. By the term dynamic instruction, we refer to a runtime instance of a static
LLVM program instruction. We define the dynamic instruction count as the actual number
of dynamic LLVM instructions executed corresponding to a specific program execution.
For example, for a simple program consisting of five static instructions in a loop that
iterates 1000 times, the static instruction count is five, while the dynamic instruction count
is 5000. For our sorting algorithms, the dynamic instruction count varies depending on the
algorithm considered and the input array, which we have to take into account to ensure
that all dynamic instructions are considered for fault injection with equal probability.
Table 2.1 gives various statistics for our sorting algorithms:
• LOC is the number of lines of code,
• SIC the number of static fault site instructions,
• MinDIC the minimum dynamic instruction count,
• MaxDIC the maximum dynamic instruction count, and
• AvgDIC the average dynamic instruction count.
Table 2.1: Experimental statistics of sorting algorithms
Algorithm LOC SIC MinDIC MaxDIC AvgDIC
BubbleSort 56 13 68k 61442k 14818k
RadixSort 61 39 30k 2040k 565k
QuickSort 65 25 34k 1110k 303k
MergeSort 70 38 79k 1269k 364k
HeapSort 77 28 15k 1519k 500k
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We initially perform a fault-free execution of an algorithm on an input to compute the
dynamic instruction count N for a particular execution. We then define the probability
of fault injection for each dynamic instruction to be 1/N. This ensures that all dynamic
instructions are equiprobable for fault injection in subsequent runs of the program on the
same input.
Figure 2.3 illustrates our fault injection strategy for this case study performed using
KULFI. First, a sorting routine is compiled using LLVM’s C front-end Clang into an LLVM
bitcode file, which contains LLVM’s intermediate representation. Then, we execute the
generated bitcode file using the LLVM virtual machine (i.e., lli) and as input, we provide a
randomly generated input array. We record the sorted output array for later comparison.
In the process, we also measure the dynamic instruction count N for this particular fault-
free execution. Using the dynamic instruction count, we compute the probability of fault
injection for each dynamic instruction as 1/N.
The original LLVM bitcode file and the computed fault injection probability are given
as inputs to KULFI. The tool generates a fault-injecting LLVM bitcode file, i.e., an instru-
mented version of the original bitcode file in which a transient fault might be injected
during execution into a dynamic instruction with the computed probability. The fault-
injecting LLVM bitcode file is then executed on the same input array. We observe the
number of injected faults and log only the executions during which exactly one fault is
injected; we call such executions 1-fault executions. Executions, where the number of
injected faults is not equal to one, are discarded. We record the outcome of every 1-fault
execution to analyze the effect of fault injection later.
2.5.2 Experimental Results
After each fault injection experiment (i.e., 100 1-fault executions), we log the number
(i.e., fraction) of executions falling into each category. For example, here is how one such
log entry might look like:
Benign: 41, Segmentation: 29, SDC: 30
At the end of every sorting algorithm fault injection campaign, we are left with 200 such


























Figure 2.3: Fault injection strategy
15
these logs and present our empirical results next.
From Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6, we observe that the values in log entries obtained after
every fault injection campaign are strongly clustered, and there is a statistically significant
distribution of the fractions for each outcome category. The larger shapes (e.g., triangles)
in the middle of clusters are indicative of the greater number of instances of faults that are
closer to the middle. More specifically, the fractions of every category of outcomes across
the 200 fault injection experiments follow the 68-95-99.7 (or three-sigma) rule of normal
distribution. Therefore, using our empirical data, we can draw statistically significant
conclusions about the behavior of the analyzed sorting routines in a faulty environment.
Figure 2.7 details the comparison of the sorting algorithms based on the average num-
ber of executions in each category of fault outcomes. For example, we observe that Bub-
bleSort, though an algorithm with higher time complexity than HeapSort, leads to more
detectable faults. In fact, HeapSort is the least resilient to SDCs and results in either benign
faults or SDCs in its fault injection campaign. QuickSort masks a majority of injected
faults and therefore a high number of benign faults. It is worthwhile to note that the
three algorithms that have the least number of detectable faults (MergeSort, QuickSort,
and HeapSort) follow a recursive divide-and-conquer algorithm design paradigm. On the
other hand, BubbleSort leads to more segmentation faults. We observe that approximately
85% of the executions of QuickSort and 90% of the executions of BubbleSort avoid SDCs.
To sum up, QuickSort is the most resilient and available algorithm of the algorithms con-
sidered. The following summarizes the resilience-related observations, where the lower
numbers are better (lower number of faults in those categories):
SDCs : Bubble < Quick < Radix < Merge < Heap
Seg. Faults : Heap < Quick < Merge < Radix < Bubble
In addition to logging execution outcomes, we also maintained a mapping of the dynamic
instruction where the fault was injected to the outcome that was produced in that execu-
tion. We draw some interesting observations from this mapping. In BubbleSort, half of the
faults injected into registers that are employed in computing the index of the array access
in the expression Array[i-1] produce segmentation faults. In HeapSort, injecting faults
into the instructions executed just before and immediately after the recursive calls causes
16
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Figure 2.4: Benign faults
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100






















Figure 2.5: Silent data corruptions
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Figure 2.6: Segmentation faults






































































Figure 2.7: Summary of fault injection campaigns
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a high percentage (close to 75%) of SDC faults. Such precise profiling of fault injection
sites enables us to observe critical instructions, specific to a sorting algorithm, where
error injection leads to SDCs. Note that one can potentially extend the notion of such
critical regions of an algorithm to other algorithms that follow similar design patterns.
Furthermore, targeted fault detection and recovery mechanisms can be employed around
these critical regions to provide cheap and effective means for improving the resilience of
programs to transient faults.
2.6 VULFI: A Fault Injector Handling Vector Instructions
Our initial effort in the form of KULFI tool gave us an excellent mechanism for eval-
uating the resilience of programs through a fault-injection driven approach which was
demonstrated by evaluating the resiliency of five well-known sorting algorithms. How-
ever, with most of the commodity processors nowadays coming by default with vector
pipelines in addition to scalar ones, there is an increasing focus to harness the raw poten-
tial of these vector pipelines for obvious performance gains. This has forced even main-
stream compilers, such as GCC [2] and Clang [1], to aggressively employ vectorization
during code generation phase. On top of that, there are specialized compilers such as ICC,
ISPC, and OpenCL, which employ advanced vectorization techniques such as automatic
loop parallelization which may require frequent enabling or disabling of a subset of the
vector lanes. For example, the latest x86 architecture supports dedicated mask registers
for enabling/disabling specific vector lanes. In these scenarios, a fault injector must track
the status of mask register bits to count the active fault sites accurately. Clearly, KULFI
was not designed to support vector architectures. Therefore, we developed a new fault
injector named VULFI (Vectorization-aware Utah’s LLVM-based Fault Injector). VULFI
has been developed from the ground up with almost no code in common with the KULFI
tool. While developing VULFI, we have applied our learning from the development effort
of KULFI, and have also added several features which are not present in KULFI such as
support for C++, ISPC, and OpenCL languages, and new options for fault site selection.2
2VULFI is publicly available at: http://formalverification.cs.utah.edu/fmr/vulfi
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2.6.1 Terminology and Assumptions
We now define our terminology as well as some of our default assumptions.
Vector and scalar instructions: An LLVM IR instruction will be referred to as an “instruc-
tion.” A vector instruction has at least one vector type operand.3 A scalar instruction has
no vector operand.
Vector and scalar registers: A vector register is an Lvalue register or a source operand of
an instruction of vector type. A scalar register is an Lvalue register or source operand
register of an instruction that has type integer, floating point, or pointer.
Vector length: The length of a vector register (Vl) is the number of scalar registers referred
to within it.
getelementptr: At IR-level, the address of an element of an aggregate data-structure,
such as an array, is calculated using getelementptr instruction.
Vector instruction – extractelement: It extracts a scalar element from a given location of
a vector register.
Vector instruction – insertelement: It inserts a scalar element at a given location of a
vector register.
Intrinsics: An intrinsic refers to a special function whose implementation is provided by
the LLVM compiler infrastructure. All LLVM intrinsics start with a prefix @llvm.
Code generation, Architecture: We refer to IR-level code generated by the ISPC compiler
with -O3 optimization targeting x86.
2.6.2 Fault Site Selection Strategy
VULFI uses one of the following fault site selection heuristics to build an initial list of
fault sites to be targeted for fault injections. Specifically, VULFI analyzes the forward slice
of a fault site, to classify it into one of the following categories:
1. Pure-data sites: The forward slice of the fault site must not have any getelementptr
(address calculation) or control-flow instructions.
2. Control sites: The forward slice must have at least one control-flow instruction.
3. Address sites: The forward slice must have at least one getelementptr.
For example, in Figure 2.8, a bit-flip occurring in the variable i may cause the loop
3The data types referred to in this work correspond to the type definitions provided in http://llvm.org/
docs/LangRef.html
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void foo(int a[], int n, int x)
{
int s = x;
for(int i=0;i<n;i++){
a[i] = a[i] * s;
s = s + i;
}
}
Figure 2.8: An example C++ function foo()
execution to either end prematurely or run greater than n iterations. It may also become
an out-of-bound index for the array a[], thereby potentially causing an invalid memory
reference. However, a bit-flip occurring in the variable s will never affect the loop control,
neither will it cause an invalid memory reference. Therefore, the variable i is an example
of both a control site and an address site whereas the variable s is an example of a pure-data
site. Figure 2.9 more formally shows how these three fault site categories relate.
2.6.3 Instrumentation Work Flow
Figure 2.10 highlights the key building blocks in VULFI and Figure 2.11 further shows
the instrumentation workflow of VULFI using an example of a vector register of length
four with each of its elements considered a unique fault site. VULFI performs the fol-
lowing three key operations as part of the instrumentation process: (1) Iterates over each
of the scalar elements in the cloned value of the vector register; (2) In each step, VULFI
extracts an uninstrumented scalar element (represented by a white circle), performs in-
strumentation, and inserts the result (represented as a solid black circle) into the vec-
tor register; (3) Finally, VULFI replaces the original vector register with its new cloned
and instrumented version, redirecting all the users of the original vector register. Fig-
ure 2.12 illustrates this on a masked vector load operation followed by a masked vector
store operation. The vector load and store operations are done using the x86 intrinsics
@llvm.x86.avx.maskload.ps.256 and @llvm.x86.avx.maskstore.ps.256, respectively.
VULFI maintains an inbuilt list of x86 intrinsics, which classifies whether any given intrin-
sic performs a masked vector operation. In the current example, this information is used








Figure 2.9: Relationship between different fault site categories
register to enable or disable load or store operations along the vector lanes. Figure 2.13
shows the instrumented version of the vector load and store operations. Each scalar ele-
ment of the vector register %0 (the chosen fault site for instrumentation) is extracted using
extractelement instruction (locations L1 and L5). The respective execution mask values
of the scalar elements are extracted from the vector register %floatmask.i (locations L2
and L6). An extracted element and its execution mask value is then passed on to the
runtime fault injection API (injectFaultFloatTy() at location L7 in the current example)
to perform actual fault injection at runtime.
2.7 Evaluation of VULFI
2.7.1 Execution Strategy
The experiments described in the section were carried out on an Intel’s CoreTMi7 4770
system running a 64-bit Ubuntu 12.04 operating system and with 16GB of main memory.
The VULFI development is done with LLVM version 3.2, and the ISPC benchmark pro-
grams are compiled using ISPC compiler version 1.8.1. A fault injection experiment involves
executing a benchmark program twice using a randomly selected program input chosen
from a predefined set of inputs. During the first execution, no faults are injected, the
execution output is recorded, and a dynamic fault site is chosen at random from a list of
dynamic fault sites. The dynamic fault sites list is built by selecting either pure-data sites,



















Report LLVM or ISPC Module
VULFI Module
Figure 2.10: Building blocks of the VULFI framework
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A vector of length 4
Clone value
Instrument the scalar 
element at index 0. . .
User 1 User N
Instrument the scalar 
element at index 1
Instrument the scalar 
element at index 2
Instrument the scalar 
element at index 3
. . .
User 1 User N
Figure 2.11: VULFI instrumentation workflow
L0: %0 = tail call <8 x float> @llvm.x86.avx.maskload.ps.256(
i8* %array_ld_addr, <8 x float> %floatmask.i)
L1: call void @llvm.x86.avx.maskstore.ps.256(i8* %array_str_addr,
<8 x float> %floatmask.i, <8 x float> %0)
Figure 2.12: Uninstrumented masked vector load and store instructions.
L0: %0 = tail call <8 x float> @llvm.x86.avx.maskload.ps.256(
i8* %array_ld_addr, <8 x float> %floatmask.i)
L1: %ext0 = extractelement <8 x float> %0, i32 0
L2: %extmask0 = extractelement <8 x float> %floatmask.i, i32 0
L3: %inj0 = call float @injectFaultFloatTy(float %ext0,
float %extmask)
L4: %ins0 = insertelement <8 x float> %0, float %inj0, i32 0
...
...
L5: %ext7 = extractelement <8 x float> %ins96, i32 7
L6: %extmask7 = extractelement <8 x float> %floatmask.i, i32 7
L7: %inj7 = call float @injectFaultFloatTy(float %ext7,
float %extmask7)
L8: %ins7 = insertelement <8 x float> %ins96, float %inj7, i32 7
L9: call void @llvm.x86.avx.maskstore.ps.256(i8* %array_str_addr,
<8 x float> %floatmask.i, <8 x float> %ins7)
Figure 2.13: Instrumented masked vector load and store instructions.
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dynamic fault site chosen during the earlier run, using the error model described in §2.2.
2.7.2 Benchmarks
Table 2.2 lists nine benchmarks that we use for our fault injection experiments using
VULFI. Benchmarks fluidanimate and swaptions are drawn from the PARVEC bench-
mark suite [21], and are vectorized implementations of their respective serial versions
available to the PARSEC benchmark suite [12, 13]. Benchmarks Blackscholes, Sorting,
Stencils, and Ray tracing are selected from the list of benchmarks available with the
public release of the ISPC compiler. The remaining three benchmarks are our ISPC im-
plementations of the respective C++ versions made available as part of the scientific com-
puting library (SCL) by Burkardt [41]. For our fault injection studies, we target the fault
sites corresponding to each vectorized function of these benchmark programs. The fault
sites are selected using one of the heuristics explained in Section 2.6.2. The benchmarks
are evaluated using AVX and SSE4 as target x86 vector instruction sets.
Figure 2.14 shows the mix of scalar and vector instructions for all nine benchmarks.
A significant portion of instructions under pure-data and control fault site categories are
vector instructions. Specifically, the number of vector instructions, averaged across all
9 benchmarks, stands at 67% and 43% for pure-data and control fault site categories. A
seemingly low percentage of vector instructions under the address category should be
taken with a grain of salt because at the IR-level, a scalar address is frequently cast into a
vector address as and when required to be used by a vector instruction. These details clearly
highlight the importance of having a fault injector that can target vector instructions—something
we achieved by creating VULFI.
A fault injection campaign comprises 100 independent fault injection experiments. The
SDC rate calculated for a fault injection campaign is considered a unique random sample.
We run a sufficient number of fault injection campaigns until: (1) the sample distribution
becomes normal or near-normal; and (2) for a target confidence level of 95%, the margin
of error for the distribution falls within the range of ±3%. We observe that for each of
our benchmarks, running 20 fault injection campaigns for each of the fault site categories
(pure-data, control, and address) is sufficient to achieve a 95% confidence level with a margin
of error of ±3%. More specifically, each row entry in the table refers to 60 fault injection













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SSE4). This pushes the total number of fault injection experiments to 9× 2× 3× 2000 =
108, 000. The margin of error is calculated by applying the standard t-value-based formula
where the sample size and the standard error of the sample distribution is known [111].
Figure 2.15 shows that among all benchmarks, Stencil and Blackscholes witness the
highest rates of SDC. In contrast, Swaptions and Conjugate Gradient have the lowest
SDC rates across all three fault site categories. Along expected lines (as these exam-
ples are array-intensive), the address fault site category results in the highest number
of program-crashes. However, for benchmarks Sorting, Stencil, and Chebyshev, the
address category also generates a significant number of SDCs. In fact, in the case of the
Chebyshev benchmark, the SDC rate under the address category is highest among all three
fault site categories. The result clearly establishes Swaptions and Conjugate Gradient
benchmarks as the most resilient programs witnessing the lowest number of SDCs and
crashes.
2.8 Related Work
Fault-tolerant computing has been very actively researched for decades, and forms the
basis of many practical techniques in use, including redundant designs, voting schemes,
and hardware-level error detection and correction schemes. There has also been an exten-
sive study to identify and ameliorate fault-inducing mechanisms at the circuit level [89].
The manifestation of faults at the software level can be modeled by flips (changes) in
bit-values of the computational state. In this work, we first compared various algorithms
on the k-unsortedness metric. More specifically, the lower the number of misplaced data
items, the more resilient the algorithm is deemed to be. In contrast, in our case study,
we assume a more fine-grained error model that accommodates more fault categories,
specifically, at the register and control-flow level. We also compare algorithms based on
the number of silent data corruptions.
One of our main contributions is the development of a fault injector called KULFI,
based on the LLVM compilation infrastructure [55, 58]. KULFI can inject transient faults
into a chosen data register of a randomly chosen program instruction at runtime. Several
previous studies have exploited fault injectors similar to KULFI [49, 99]. There are also
efforts that directly inject faults into the hardware [61]. Hardware-based fault injection is








































































































































































































































OS-level facilities [49, 99]. Other software-level fault injectors include those based on
PIN [31, 48]. Specifically, the PDSFIS fault injector [48] uses Intel’s PIN framework.
In contrast to the above works, KULFI uses the open-source LLVM compiler infras-
tructure, similarly to other recently reported fault injectors [31, 59]. The fault injector
LLFI [59] is primarily geared towards injecting errors in soft-computing applications. LLFI
and KULFI were developed concurrently, and currently, they share many similar features.
However, when we started working on this project, KULFI was the only tool available to
us that had all of the required features. For example, KULFI provides fine-grained error
injection control (briefly discussed in the next section), which suits well our requirements
for performing the experimental evaluations described in this chapter. The fault injector
used in the Relax framework [31] also uses the LLVM compiler infrastructure. However,
this fault injector is not publicly available. Furthermore, a previous informal study by a
Relax user suggests that KULFI is easier to control and fine-tune, while also providing
interesting command-line options not found in Relax [24].
Next, driven by the requirement of targeting vector architectures for fault injection,
we developed a new tool called VULFI. A recent fault injection study, done by Hari et
al., introduces an assembly-level fault injector SASSIFI built specifically for NVIDIA’s
CUDA architecture [44]. Another CUDA-centric fault injection study done by Fang et
al. introduces a new fault injector GPU-Qin [37] which uses the CUDA debugger tool to
insert breakpoints at program locations where fault injections are to be done. In contrast
to these fault injectors, ULFI targets vector instructions at LLVM-level with the awareness
for architecture-specific vector extensions such as Intel’s AVX and SSE instruction sets. We
believe that by targeting LLVM-level vector instructions, it allows VULFI to support any
SPMD front-end compiler which uses LLVM as the backend for machine code generation.
To summarize, to the best of our knowledge, we did not find any publicly available
LLVM-based fault injectors targeting either scalar or vector architectures at the time when
we started our resilience research.
2.9 Discussion
The fault injectors presented in this chapter are developed using LLVM compiler in-
frastructure and target LLVM IR-level virtual instructions for fault injections. The er-
ror models, implemented by these fault injectors, consider targeting a single instruction
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out of the total number of dynamic virtual instructions observed at runtime for a given
program. While this approach ensures an unbiased way of selecting a dynamic LLVM
instruction, it has a limitation as an LLVM instruction may get translated into one or more
architecture-specific instructions and different architecture-level instructions may have
different execution cycle requirements. On the other hand, given that most of the LLVM
instructions are architecture-agnostic, it allows these fault injectors to scale on various ar-
chitectures supported by the LLVM infrastructure. Therefore, the fault injectors presented
in this chapter provide a reasonable trade-off between architecture-level accuracy versus
scalability.
Another point to consider is that the fault injection experiments done on sorting rou-
tines using KULFI target control and data fault sites. When a control fault site is targeted,
the elements of an input array to be sorted remain corruption free but the output array
may still finally be unsorted. In contrast, when a data site is targeted for fault injection,
an element of the input array itself may get corrupted. In this scenario, the output array
may appear sorted, but it has an element missing which is part of the original input array.
In our experimental results, we categorize both these scenarios, where either the output
array is unsorted, or the output array is sorted but not all of its elements belong to the
original input array, as cases of SDC.
2.10 Conclusion
In this dissertation work, we first presented a unique, thorough case study of the
resilience of several popular and widely used sorting algorithms. To be able to perform
such an extensive resilience study, we first implemented a new, open source LLVM-level
fault injector called KULFI. Faults injected by KULFI at the LLVM-level provide a reason-
able fault model for actual hardware faults. Using KULFI, we performed an extensive
empirical study that observed the behavior of sorting algorithms when faults are being
injected. Based on the statistically significant results of this study, we drew informative
conclusions about the resilience of these algorithms. Our empirical results aim to serve as
guidance for software developers that have to take resilience into account when choosing
an appropriate sorting routine for their task. Our next primary contribution in this dis-
sertation work is a well-engineered fault injector named VULFI which is geared towards
vector architectures. We demonstrated the effectiveness of VULFI by carrying out a fault
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injection study on a set of 12 vector benchmarks drawn from Parvec, ISPC, and SCL
benchmark suites. Our experimental results demonstrated that these vector programs
when compiled produce a nontrivial fraction of vector instruction under three fault site
categories – pure-data, address, and control. Finally, we observed a variation in SDC
rates witnessed by these benchmarks. These results not only proved the robustness and




INDUCED BY SOFT ERRORS
3.1 Introduction
Bit-flips affecting the runtime control-flow in a program may lead to the execution of
an unintended program path, thereby potentially producing an incorrect result. There-
fore, we present two novel approaches for detecting control-flow deviations caused in
programs targeted to run on scalar and vector architectures, respectively. Specifically, the
first approach is geared towards detecting control flow deviations in scalar architectures
and builds on the basic tenets of predicate-abstraction [8, 28, 42], although we do apply
abstractions that tend to reflect the degree of degradation of control-flows during pro-
gram execution. To formally explain the control-flow deviations in a program caused
by bit-flips, we found it natural to adopt a predicate-abstraction-based approach. Our
overall goal is to observe and explain these bit-flips regarding their effect on abstract
predicate state transitions. Therefore, we adopt the predicate-abstraction-based approach
introduced by Ball [7]; while Ball used predicate-abstraction to define a novel program
coverage metric, we use it to study faulty behaviors in a more manageable abstract state
space.
In contrast, our second approach focuses on detecting control-flow deviations in vector
loops. This approach exploits the code generation logic in the ISPC compiler [3,81] to mine
invariants about specific control sites in vector loops. To the best of our knowledge, both
the approaches, the first one using predicate-abstraction and the second one requiring
invariant mining by analyzing code generation patterns in a vector compiler, to detect
control-flow deviations, are novel research directions in resilience research.
33
3.2 Unique Research Contributions
Note that we have come up with these two approaches as part of two separate re-
search efforts and therefore, they represent two disjoint ideas sharing a common thread of
detecting control-flow deviations. Consequently, we have divided this chapter into two
parts detailing the approaches as mentioned earlier.
Specifically, Part I described in Section 3.3 makes the following unique contributions:
• We present a novel abstraction method for programs executing in the presence of
single-bit faults. We show how the abstraction explains the measured resilience re-
sults to some extent which is enough to serve as a way to rank one sorting algorithm
above another.
• We propose a novel way to build error detectors using predicate-abstraction to detect
the presence of soft errors causing single-bit faults affecting the runtime control-flow
of a program leading to control-flow deviations. These detectors rely on tracking
predicate transitions to detect invalid ones which only occur in the presence of faults
affecting a control-flow. We demonstrate the effectiveness of these detectors by
applying them to a set of well-known sorting algorithms.
• To make our proposed error detectors scalable, we further develop an error detection
framework named FUSED (Framework at Utah for Soft Error Detection), developed
using ROSE compiler infrastructure [84, 88], to automatically instrument a target
program for extracting a set of valid predicate transitions which are then used as
likely invariants to detect errors.
• We evaluate the scalability and the efficacy of the FUSED framework and its un-
derlying technique, which involves using predicate transitions for error detection, by
evaluating it on an open source LU factorization routine drawn from the SuperLU
library [33, 57]. We report the detection rate and the average performance overhead
witnessed by the error detectors which are automatically deployed using FUSED in
the LU factorization routine.
• We also present a heuristic to identify highly sensitive code-blocks in the LU factor-
ization routine of the SuperLU library, with a possible future application in optimiz-
ing the placement of the error detectors built by FUSED.
Section 3.4 presents our second approach of detecting control-flow deviations in vector
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loops and makes the following unique contributions:
• We demonstrate extracting LLVM IR-level loop invariants for a foreach loop sup-
ported in the ISPC compiler to synthesize error detectors. Our findings highlight
that the understanding of underlying code generation is central to discovering these
invariants. We introduce our error models, set up our definitions, and provide an
overview of our case studies.
• Also, we evaluate how well our detector types cover critical situations in practice.
We also employ the LLVM IR-level loop invariants to build soft error detectors,
reporting their efficacy and overhead using Intel’s open source ISPC [3, 81] as the
language and the compiler of choice.
3.3 Part I: Detecting Control-Flow Deviations Using
Predicate-Abstraction
Given a set of predicates Φ = {φ1, ..., φk} pertaining to program states, we can define
abstract program states to be k-bit vectors representing the truth values of these predicates.
As a running example, let us consider a three-variable program with three variables x, y,
and z of type Int, and let us choose two predicates x > y and x + y = z. Let x = y = z = 0
initially. One can define the abstract reachable state space of a program under predicate-
abstraction as follows:
• The initial abstract state is obtained by assessing the predicates in the actual (con-
crete) initial state, thus obtaining a k-bit vector. In our example, the abstract state
initial state is 〈0 > 0, 0+ 0 = 0〉, i.e., 〈 f alse, true〉.
• For every concrete program transition, we update the abstract state reached suitably.
Thus, a program statement x++ executed in the initial state will transition to state
〈1 > 0, 1+ 0 = 0〉, i.e., 〈true, f alse〉.
Whenever a predicate is undefined in a state or one of the variables referred to in it is out
of scope, the evaluation of the predicate is undefined, and recorded as X. It is clear that
by evaluating each concrete state transition and applying the abstraction defined by the
vector of predicates, we obtain a boolean state transition system. Typical predicates cho-
sen for defining such a predicate-abstraction are the program conditionals and program
invariants. For our studies in this dissertation work, we choose program conditionals. As




Table 3.1 shows the tracking of spurious predicate transitions to detect soft errors which
cause a control-flow violation (case 2), and a data error (case 3). In the example, labels
L0–L5 are the program locations, and PP0–PP4 are the program points. We choose the
program conditionals (x < 5) and (y < 4) as the predicates. In general, these predicates
govern the major control-flow steps in a program, and therefore are important to under-
standing a program’s behaviors. The selected set of predicates defines our abstract states.
We evaluate a vector of these predicates at chosen critical program locations, typically
where one of the predicates governs control-flow, thereby effectively computing reachable
abstract states at those locations. A predicate state concerning a program point PP is
defined as PP:〈φ1φ2〉, where 〈φ1φ2〉 is a bit-vector. In the bit-vector 〈φ1φ2〉, φ1 and φ2
represent the boolean values of the chosen predicates (x < 5) and (y < 4), respectively,
at the program point PP. Using this definition, the concrete predicate state observed at
the program point PP0 is PP0:FT as the predicates (x < 5) and (y < 4) evaluate to
false and true, respectively. A predicate transition comprises a current state, a next state,
and a transition from the current to the next state. For example, in case 1, the concrete
predicate transition with respect to PP0 and PP3 is represented as PP0:FT→ PP3:FT, where
PP0:FT and PP3:FT are the concrete predicate states at the program points PP0 and PP3,
respectively. In cases 2 and 3, a bit-flip (induced by a soft error) causes SDC in the program
output, and spurious predicate transitions (both highlighted in red color) which are absent
in the fault-free execution instance shown in case 1.
3.3.2 Another Example: Predicate Transition Diagram for BubbleSort
We present yet another example which leverages predicate-abstraction using Bubble-
Sort. Figure 3.1 shows the source code of BubbleSort for which we generate a predicate
transition diagram. We choose predicates i > 0, j ≤ i, and array[j− 1] > array[j] from the
BubbleSort routine, and analyze the effect of single-bit faults on the chosen predicates. In
our example, we mark the program points in the BubbleSort routine starting with a label
PP0 and ending with a label PP6. The evaluation of a predicate at a program point depends









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PP0: //state --> XXX
L0: for (i = (size - 1); i > 0; i--){
PP1: //state --> TXX
L1: for (j = 1; j <= i; j++){
PP2: //state --> TTX
L2: if (array[j-1] > array[j]){
PP3: //state --> TTT
L3: swap(array[j-1],array[j])
PP4: //state --> TTF
} else {




PP: //state --> TFX
}
}
Figure 3.1: BubbleSort with encoded predicate states
example, at PP1 only the first predicate is in scope, and at PP0, none of the predicates are
in scope (i.e., none of the variables appearing in any of the predicates are in scope). The
truth values of predicates not in scope are recorded as X, which stands for ”unknown.”
Having instrumented the BubbleSort routine with appropriate predicate evaluators, we
run it with and without faults injected, observe the abstract state transitions made, and
superimpose the transitions in a predicate transition diagram. Multiple such runs are
performed, one for each permutation of a fixed-size input array, to accomplish a higher
degree of coverage of all possible executions of BubbleSort. Our empirical approach,
which generates the predicate transition diagrams dynamically, ensures that it indeed
represents over-approximations of the reachable state space.
The outcome is a diagram shown in Figure 3.2. We use the following conventions in
this figure:
• The solid (black) edges are valid transitions observed during both fault-free and faulty
executions, under some input.
• The dotted (red) edges are invalid transitions that are never observed during fault-free
runs; they are spurious state transitions caused by fault injection.
Note that in our current implementation, we carry out the described predicate evalu-






















Figure 3.2: An abstract predicate transition diagram of BubbleSort
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and without fault injection is that it provides an instantaneous visualization of the effect
of faults on the overall program execution. Furthermore, Section 3.3.5 provides a pre-
liminary assessment of our error detectors synthesized using the predicates employed in
predicate transition diagrams. One of the continuing challenges in this line of research is
to synthesize such error detectors that are extremely lightweight but still efficient enough
in trapping the greatest number of faults.
3.3.3 Generating Predicate Transition Diagrams
The general approach of building predicate transition diagrams of the kind illustrated
in Figure 3.2 is as follows:
• Given a collection of predicates and locations in a program, we instrument each of
these locations with a call to a predicate evaluation function. This function takes
predicates as inputs, evaluates them at the given program points, and returns a
three-valued vector containing values true (T), false (F), and unknown (X) for each
predicate. An unknown value is generated for a predicate if there is a variable in the
predicate that is undefined at the program point.
• For a given program, let δ be its fault-free predicate transition relation and δF its
predicate transition relation under faults. These transition relations are defined for
a general program input.
• To combine these transition relations into a meaningful and informative predicate
transition diagram, we create a solid (black) edge for every transition in δ and a
dotted (red) edge for every transition in δF \ δ.
3.3.4 Experimental Results I
We now apply the procedure described earlier on all our sorting algorithms to gen-
erate their predicate transition diagrams. Then, we perform a preliminary assessment
of the usefulness of the generated diagrams for estimating resilience of our algorithms.
Figure 3.3 shows the abstract predicate transition diagram of QuickSort.1 If we do a visual
comparison of Figures 3.2 and 3.3, we can notice a higher degree of invalid transitions
(dotted edges) in the BubbleSort diagram. This corresponds to the fact that the number





























Figure 3.3: An abstract predicate transition diagram of QuickSort
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of benign faults in BubbleSort is much lower than in QuickSort, which in turn leads us to
compare the degree of valid transitions in our diagrams against the fraction of exhibited
benign faults.
Table 3.2 provides statistics of the generated predicate transition diagrams on the num-
ber of valid and invalid transitions. We compared the percentage of valid transitions
against the percentage of benign faults, and as it turns out, there appears to be a rough
correlation between these numbers: a higher percentage of benign faults typically implies
higher percentage of valid transitions. While this is a very preliminary, crude exploration
that should be taken with a grain of salt, as an area of future work, we are planning to
explore this and similar connections further. For example, we could refine our diagrams
to include probabilities of particular transitions being taken, which would enable us to
reason more precisely about how often particular invalid transitions are taken.
3.3.5 From Predicate Transition Diagrams to Error Detectors
In this section, we summarize our preliminary experiments that illustrate how error
detectors can be synthesized based on insights gained from predicate transition diagrams.
In a predicate transition diagram, the presence of invalid transitions may be leveraged
to detect occurrences of single-bit faults. Hence, we devise a simple approach that uses
generated predicate transition diagrams to detect faults occurring during execution of a
sorting algorithm automatically. First, we compute a complete set of reachable abstract
states for a fault-free sorting routine by running it on all possible inputs as described
previously. Obviously, every subsequent run of the program under no faults must visit
only states within this complete set. If not, we can surmise that the program execution has
experienced a single-bit fault. These faults may result in a segmentation fault, turn out to
be benign, or worse still, or result in an SDC.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach, we use KULFI to test it on our
Table 3.2: Experimental statistics of predicate transition diagrams
Algorithm Invalid Transitions Valid Transitions Total
BubbleSort 38 (71%) 16 (29%) 54 (100%)
RadixSort 64 (72%) 25 (28%) 89 (100%)
QuickSort 35 (53%) 32 (47%) 67 (100%)
MergeSort 67 (47%) 76 (53%) 143 (100%)
HeapSort 56 (66%) 29 (34%) 85 (100%)
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sorting routines empirically. We run every sorting routine on an array of a given size
where each element is initialized with a random value. During the execution, we inject
exactly one fault using KULFI; also, we make sure that we only keep faults that cause
SDCs and disregard others that we are not interested in. We also capture the set of
reachable abstract states and check whether it is included in our initial complete set of
abstract states. If not, we report an error detection. We perform these experiments on all
five sorting routines with the size of input arrays fixed to 200; each routine is repeatedly
executed until we obtain 1000 unique execution instances with each having SDC in its
output.
Table 3.3 summarizes the error detection statistics. Note that the error detection statis-
tics refer to the detection of only those faults which cause SDC in our experiments. The
column ”% Errors Detected” gives the percentage of faults (out of 1000 SDC-causing
faults injected) that our approach successfully detected. The error detection percentage
varies from 33.7% all the way to 100%, with an average of 77.6%, which clearly shows
the promise of the approach. Clearly, sorting is an extreme example of a system where
data (i.e., the items being sorted) directly affects control-flow. In general, the degree to
which data affects control will determine the success of error detection based purely on
control-flow tracking. Another point worth noting is that for a small-scale study such
as ours, to build a reachable predicate state space, we execute a program on all possible
inputs. In the future, and especially for larger experiments, we might use static analysis
and/or sampling-based techniques for building the reachable state space. We will also
incorporate lessons from previous work on control-flow tracking-based error detection
cited earlier. Our hope is to bring the insight of predicate transition diagrams into this
field.
Table 3.3: Error detection rates in various sorting algorithms








3.3.6 Automated Mining of Predicate Transitions
FUSED automates the task of source-level instrumentation for extracting likely invari-
ants from a target program and inserting these invariants back into the target program
for detecting errors. All instrumentations are carried out as source-level transformations
using the ROSE compiler infrastructure. Specifically, these transformations are done by
modifying the abstract syntax tree (AST) representation of the target program.
Figure 3.4 shows the two modes of operation for the FUSED framework: (i) profiler
mode, and (ii) detector mode. The profiler mode is used to extract the likely program
invariants in the form of a set of concrete predicate transitions. The detector mode is used
for building and inserting error detectors in the target program.
3.3.7 Generating Likely Invariants
In the profiler mode, FUSED generates a separate profiler function for each function in
the target program. The profiler function takes program points, and the concrete values
of the boolean program conditionals of the target function, as inputs. The generated
profiler function’s definition is inserted into the target program. Function invocation code
Figure 3.4: Workflow of FUSED framework
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to call the profiler function is also inserted at user-selected locations in the target function.
Fault-free executions of the instrumented program for a training input set produce a set
of concrete predicate transitions. We call this set of concrete predicate transitions the valid
predicate transitions which are used as likely invariants for runtime error detection.
Figure 3.5 formally presents the key steps involved in inserting profilers in a target
program to extract likely invariants. Specifically, the function Pro f ileTransitions() accepts
a target program P and a profiler function Apro f iler as inputs. All the atomic boolean
program conditionals involving non-pointers in the program P are chosen as a set of
predicatesΦ by calling the SelectPredicates() interface of the FUSED framework. Program
conditionals involving pointers when subjected to soft errors would most likely lead to
segmentation faults and are therefore ignored. The profilers are inserted in P by invoking
the InsertPro f ilers() interface to generate output program Ppro f iler. The instrumented
program Ppro f iler is then executed for a preselected training input set Itrain. Predicate
transitions captured from each and every execution are aggregated into a set of valid
predicate transitions δV which is used as the likely invariants by the error detectors.
3.3.8 Building Detectors
In the detector mode, FUSED generates a new detector function for each function in
a target program. The detector function accepts the same set of input arguments as the
profiler function, and is inserted in the target program at user-defined program points.
Error detectors in the form of function invocations to the detector function are inserted
in the target function. These detectors, when invoked at runtime, evaluate the currently
observed concrete predicate transition, and check whether it is present in the list of valid
predicate transitions. A concrete predicate transition missing from the list of valid predicate
1: ProfileTransitions(P,Apro f iler) {
2: Φ← SelectPredicates(P)
3: Ppro f iler ← InsertPro f ilers(P, Apro f iler,Φ)
4: for all Ii in Itrain {
5: Spredi ← Executed(Ppro f iler, i)
6: δVi ← GetPredicateTransitions(Spred,i)
7: δV ← δV ∪ δVi
8: }
9: }
Figure 3.5: FUSED algorithm for profiling valid predicate transitions
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transitions signals the detection of an error, and is called an invalid predicate transition.
Section 3.3.10 presents a heuristic to identify sensitive-code-blocks using these invalid
predicate transitions.
Figure 3.6 shows the key steps involved in inserting error detectors in P where Adetector
is the actual detector function to be invoked at runtime to check for errors. The detectors are
inserted into the target program P by invoking the InsertDetectors() interface to generate
the instrumented program Pdetector. The program Pdetector is executed for a set of test input
vectors Itest. During each execution iteration i, the set of observed predicate transitions
δOi is compared with the set δV . Any predicate transition in δOi which is absent in δV
is considered a valid predicate transition which is unprofiled during the profiler mode of
execution, and is added to the set δV . The program Pdetector is then executed for the set of
test input vectors Itest and faults are injected during the program executions. During each
execution iteration i, the set of observed predicate transitions δOi is compared with the set
δV . The transitions in the set δI are called the invalid predicate transitions and used by the
detectors to signal runtime error detection.
3.3.9 Addressing False Alarms
Our approach of using likely invariants (in the form of valid predicate transitions) suffers
from a natural drawback of being prone to false alarms. To reduce false alarms for our
experimentations, we extract the set of invalid predicate transitions observed during fault-
free executions, and add them to the set of valid predicate transitions. In general, one good
strategy for reducing false alarms is to use a larger sample size for the training input set
to bring down the false alarm rate to an acceptable limit.
1: DetectSoftErrors(P,Adetector) {
2: Φ← SelectPredicates(P)
3: Pdetector ← InsertDetectors(P, Adetector,Φ)
4: for all Ii in Itest {
5: Spredi ← Execute(Pdetector, Ii)
6: δOi ← GetPredicateTransitions(Spredi)





Figure 3.6: FUSED algorithm for soft error detection
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3.3.10 Identifying Vulnerable Code Regions
Figure 3.7 presents a heuristic to identify sensitive-code-blocks which under influence
of soft errors are most likely to cause SDC in the program output. A set of top invalid
predicate transitions δT is selected from the set of invalid predicate transitions δI based on their
frequency of occurrence during the faulty program executions, by invoking the FUSED
interface GetTopInvalidTransitions(). The elements in the set δT are further sorted in the
order of their places of occurrence in the program Pdetector to obtain an ordered set δTsorted.
For each predicate transition, δi in the set δTsorted which has an enclosing code block with
one or more program statements, the corresponding program statements are added to the
set Stmti. Each program statement in Stmti is syntactically analyzed to see if they can
influence the runtime concrete boolean values of the predicates in the set Φ. The program
statements affecting the concrete boolean values of the predicates are added to the set
Stmt. The set Stmt is considered as the set of program statements in the program P which
are most vulnerable to soft errors.
3.3.11 Experimental Results II
We evaluate the FUSED framework by assessing it on the sequential SuperLU scientific
library. We choose the training and the test input sets for our experimentations from a vari-
ety of problem domains available in the University of Florida sparse matrix collection [30].
For our experimentations, we restrict the placement of the profilers and the detectors to
the dgstrf() function in the SuperLU routine which is the core function responsible for
1: IdentifyVulnerableCodeBlocks(δI) {
2: δT ← GetTopInvalidTransitions(δI)
3: δTsorted ← SortByProgramLocation(δT)
4: for all δi in δTsorted {
5: Stmti ← GetEnclosingCodeBlock(δi)
6: for all stmtj in Stmti {
7: Var ← GetCommonVar(stmtj,Φ)
8: if Var is empty {





Figure 3.7: FUSED heuristic for identifying vulnerable code blocks
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performing LU factorization. In our experimentations, we consider placing the profilers
and the detectors after every program statement of the dgstrf() function. Choosing this
option helps us with our preliminary study of analyzing the influence of different program
properties on the set of concrete predicate transitions observed in the faulty and fault-free
execution traces.
Table 3.4 lists the set of input matrices used in our experiments and their classification
based on the problem domain. In our experimentations, we carry out 20 fault injection
campaigns for each of the input categories. Each of these fault injection campaigns com-
prises 1000 runs which sum up to 20,000 fault injection experiments for each of the five
input categories to obtain a statistically significant result. We use KULFI, an instruction
level fault injector for fault injections [54, 96].
Before starting the fault injection campaigns, the outputs from the fault-free executions
of the SuperLU library with all the test inputs are recorded as golden program outputs. We
also profile the set of valid predicate transitions by running the instrumented version of
the SuperLU library with profilers inserted after every program statement of its dgstrf()
function. The training input matrix for the profiler mode of execution is chosen at random
from the respective input category.
During each run of a fault injection campaign, an instrumented version of the SuperLU
library with detectors inserted after every program statement in its dgstrf() function is ex-
ecuted. The test input matrix for the detector mode of execution is chosen at random from
the respective input category and is different from the one used during the profiler mode of
execution. During the program execution, the detectors use the previously generated set
of valid predicate transitions to detect soft errors injected using KULFI at runtime. Finally,
FUSED compiles the error detection statistics at the end of all those runs in which an SDC
Table 3.4: Input classification
Problem Domain Input Category AvgDIC Minimum Input Size
Optimization I bp 262k 822 x 822
Optimization II str 122k 363 x 363
Computational Fluid
Dynamics cavity 92k 317 x 317
2D/3D fs 541 152k 541 x 541
Circuit Simulation oscil dcop 135k 430 x 430
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is observed in the program output. During each run of the SuperLU library, we inject
exactly one single-bit fault into a data register of a randomly chosen LLVM-level dynamic
instruction using the instruction-level fault injector KULFI. The dynamic LLVM-level in-
struction is chosen with a probability of 1N , where N is the total number of LLVM-level
dynamic instructions enumerated. This error model has been the model of choice for
various resilience studies done in the recent past [31, 96].
In Table 3.4, AvgDIC is the average dynamic instruction count. In general, the SuperLU
library is resilient with a very low average rate of SDC in the execution output, ranging
between 7.2 and 11.7 per 1000 fault injection experiments. The SDC rates, shown in
Figure 3.8, are calculated by averaging the individual results obtained from the 20 fault
injection campaigns per input category, and are statistically significant as they follow the
three-sigma rule. The highest average SDC detection rate of 90.59% is observed for cavity
input category. The average SDC detection rate across all the five input categories stands
at 72.6% with an average execution overhead of 15.7%. An average false alarm rate of
35.6% is observed during the experimentations, which is addressed using the method
described in Section 3.3.9.
Table 3.5 shows the list of sensitive-code-blocks obtained by applying the heuristic
presented in Figure 3.7. Sensitive-code-blocks are the code regions in the program which,
in the presence of soft errors, are most likely to cause SDC in the program output. Inter-
estingly, the list of most sensitive program statements observed across all input categories
is identical.
3.4 Part II: Error Detectors for Vector Loops
Vectorization is primarily supported in the form of: (i) language-specific vector ex-
tensions which are supported in modern compilers such as GCC [2] and Clang [1], and
(ii) dedicated programming languages with inbuilt support for data-level parallelisms
such as ISPC and OpenCL [73] that can enable vectorization to occur more predictably
and under programmer control. Thus, languages such as ISPC and OpenCL, and their
associated compilers, must be part of the research focus; we found no prior work targeting
this angle. Also, there is an intriguing possibility that compiler writers of such languages
have taken care to explain their code generator, and even provided some hints on the





























Table 3.5: Sensitive code blocks
Line# Program Statement
280 kcol = relax end[jcol];
306 k = xa begin[icol];
330 k = jcol + 1;
349 k = (jj - jcol) * m;
384 jcol += panel size;
torization supported by bit masking. We invested a significant amount of time studying
ISPC’s publicly available code generator (well-supported in this effort by the compiler
team who answered our questions promptly), and found that it offers another intriguing
wrinkle regarding fault detector synthesis: namely that these invariants could be turned into
lightweight error detectors. This achieves two purposes at once:
1. One may be able to exploit specific patterns during code generation to tune and gen-
erate low overhead error detectors. While no single error detector type is sufficient
to trap all types of faults (and our detectors are no exception), the attraction of error
detectors that incur low overheads, are effective at trapping many faults, and (last
but not least) can be automatically generated and inserted is potentially of huge interest
in transferring resilience research into practice.
2. The dialog between the resilience research community and the compiler community
may be a two-way street in that knowing the needs of the resilience community, com-
piler writers may be encouraged to document their compiler-backends more and
provide features that support the generation of even more low overhead resilience
solutions.
We demonstrate extracting IR-level loop invariants for a foreach loop supported in the
ISPC compiler to synthesize error detectors. Our findings highlight that the understand-
ing of underlying code generation is central to discovering these invariants. In Section 3.3.11,
we evaluate how well our detector types cover important situations in practice. We also
employ the IR-level loop invariants to build soft error detectors, reporting their efficacy
and overhead, using Intel’s open source ISPC as the language and the compiler of choice.
As an initial step, we first describe two specific instances of how compilation methods can
be exploited to generate error-checking invariants based on the code-generation logic of
compilers.
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3.4.1 Example 1: Loop Invariants in a foreach Loop Construct
An ISPC foreach loop accepts one or more dimension variables2of integer types with
the iteration space of each dimension variable bounded by an interval [start, end]. A
foreach loop uses its dimension variables as iterators to iterate over the loop body. To
maximize lane utilization, for a given dimension variable, ISPC uniformly distributes first
{n− (n%Vl)} loop iterations across Vl vector lanes, where n = end− start. The rest of the
n%Vl loop iterations are handled separately.
Consider Figure 3.9 which presents the control-flow graph (CFG) of the vector copy
function, vcopy ispc of Figure 3.10. The uniform qualifier appearing in vcopy ispc
denotes that all vector lanes share the same address of arrays a1 and a2, as well as the
variable n. The foreach full body basic block executes {n − (n%Vl)} times with all Vl
vector lanes performing parallel copy operations. The remaining n%Vl loop iterations are
done in the basic block partial inner all only. The values {n− (n%Vl)} and n%Vl are
represented by the definitions aligned end and nextras, respectively, in the entry basic
block allocas. The definition new counter is the loop iterator for the foreach full body
basic block. Based on these facts, one can construct the following loop invariants for
foreach constructs, as shown in Figure 3.11. Clearly, such invariants must always hold
within, as well as upon exit from, foreach loop appearing in an ISPC program (to mini-
mize overheads, we check them only upon exit).
3.4.2 Example 2: Protecting uniform Variables
In ISPC, a uniform variable is shared across all vector lanes. The compiler achieves
this by storing a uniform value first into a scalar register and then broadcasting it to
a vector register. In Figure 3.12 (typical result of compiling a code block containing a
uniform variable), uval is a scalar register storing a uniform value. This value is first
copied to the first element of the vector register uval broadcast init, and subsequently
broadcast to all other locations using shufflevector instruction. The resultant value is
stored in the vector register uval broadcast. A bit-flip affecting any of the scalar elements
of uval broadcast can be detected by inserting a piece of checker code which ensures that
all scalar elements hold the same value before every read from uval broadcast (inexpen-
2In this work, we have considered foreach loops with only one dimension variable, but our findings are





%nextras = srem i32 %n, 8 







%counter = phi i32 [ 0, %foreach_full_body.lr.ph ], [ %new_counter, %foreach_full_body ]
. . .











Figure 3.9: Control-flow graph of the vcopy ispc() function
void vcopy_ispc(uniform int a1[], uniform int a2[], uniform int n){ 





Figure 3.10: ISPC implementation of vector copy
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Invariant 1: new_counter ≥ 0
Invariant 2: new_counter ≤ aligned_end
Invariant 3: (new_counter % Vl) == 0
Figure 3.11: Loop invariants for foreach full body basic block
%uval_broadcast_init = insertelement <8 x float> undef,
float %uval, i32 0
%uval_broadcast = shufflevector <8 x float> %uval_broadcast_init,
<8 x float> undef, <8 x i32> zeroinitializer
Figure 3.12: Broadcasting the value of the uniform variable uval to a vector register
sively achieved by XORing.) Such detectors can provide good, though not perfect, error
detection coverage at very low cost. We have implemented a prototype LLVM transforma-
tion pass implementing the detector described in Section 3.4.1. Our prototype implemen-
tation automatically inserts a detector basic block for each occurrence of foreach loop in a
program (Figure 3.11 highlights this block, namely foreach fullbody check invariants).
This block contains a call instruction which calls our runtime detector API that takes
new counter, aligned end, and Vl as arguments. As noted earlier, we invoke the detector
block only upon loop exit.
3.4.3 Error Detection Study
We evaluate the efficacy of the error detectors based on foreach loop invariants de-
scribed in Section 3.4.1 on micro-benchmarks vector copy, vector dot product, and vector sum.
Due to the (relatively) smaller size of these benchmarks, we follow a more comprehensive
evaluation strategy by carrying out 2000 fault injection experiments for each of the micro-
benchmarks under each of the fault site categories pure-data, control, and address. The
detector’s effectiveness is measured in terms of percentage of fault injection experiments
that ends up in SDCs, together with the number that get flagged by our detectors.
The loop invariants in Figure 3.11 depend on the IR-level loop iterator new counter.
The value of this loop iterator is used to evaluate the loop exit condition, and also to
calculate the addresses of the array elements referenced in the micro-benchmarks. There-
fore, fault sites affecting the loop iterator will be categorized as either a control site or an
address site or both, but can never be a pure-data site adhering to the relation shown in
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Figure 2.9. Figure 3.13 confirms our hypothesis, showing that no SDCs are detected when
pure-data sites are targeted for fault injection. In contrast, faults affecting control sites lead
to the highest SDC rates, namely 96.5% for vector sum. In addition, 48.7% of the total fault
injection experiments that end up in SDCs are also successfully detected.
Overall, the highest SDC detection rate is witnessed under control site category, with
detectors approaching a detection rate of 57% for both vector copy and dot product micro-
benchmarks. Faults affecting address sites report a relatively low SDC rate because a
substantial number of fault injection experiments end up in program-crashes.
The overhead incurred by our detectors is measured by executing and comparing the
runtimes of an instrumented program binary with and without the detector block inserted.
Average overhead is calculated by averaging the overhead data from 2,000 individual runs
for each micro-benchmark. A low average overhead of approximately 8% is witnessed
across all three micro-benchmarks. We believe that with increasing operation counts
inside the foreach loop body (compared to our very short loop bodies), the overhead
introduced by these detector blocks will further get amortized. The examples presented
earlier and the preliminary results discussed here have been quite encouraging, and it
certainly opens up future avenues for exploiting compilation-aware detectors.
3.5 Related Work
There has been a significant amount of research on optimizing the placement of the
error detectors [43, 75, 109, 112]. Research on using compiler-based techniques to de-
tect hardware faults has also been reported [76, 113]. In a recent work [47], the focus
is primarily on fault recovery (not on error detection) and custom annotations in the
source language to convey the degree of resilience desired. Casas et al. [20] make a
large-scale numerical application resilient by employing redundancy methods to guard
pointers, and showing that some algorithms can recover from faults. Sahoo et al. [90]
introduce an approach that employs likely program invariants for detecting hardware
faults. SymPLFIED [78] is a formal framework that uses symbolic values to represent
hardware faults, and performs a symbolic execution to simulate the propagation of such
faults. It analyzes fault propagation patterns to optimize the placement of fault detectors.
Several techniques have been proposed to detect transient faults that cause control-





















































































































































































basic block and tracking the signatures at runtime. Subsequently, Venkatasubramanian et
al. [107] proposed a more refined and optimized solution. In contrast to these approaches,
our technique is based on the use of predicate-abstraction [42].
Hardware faults evading hardware and micro-architectural level protections cause
random bit-flips in the application computational states. These hardware faults intro-
duced can either be permanent or transient in nature. Transient hardware faults (a.k.a. soft
errors) typically persist for a short duration, and are often attributed to cosmic radiations
and alpha particles [65,86]. Transient hardware faults occurring in the CPU state elements
can cause application hang, crash, or silent data corruption (SDC) in the execution output,
and are harder to detect as compared to permanent hardware faults. This has led to a
recent upsurge towards developing low-cost application-level detectors as an alternative
to hardware-level solutions.
There has been an effort to develop application-level detectors by monitoring software-
level program properties and extracting likely invariants [90]. Another work involves
similar approach for building error detectors in the form of program assertions by an-
alyzing program properties and related rules on a set of dynamic execution traces [79].
Techniques are also proposed to build application-specific detectors by analyzing program
properties where the majority of the SDC causing soft errors are visible [43]. Another
approach builds architecture-level detectors by tracking history of the processor states on
static instructions of a program. The history information is then used for detecting soft
errors occurring in the processor elements [85]. Software-level detectors based on pure
control-flow tracking have also been developed [72]. Algorithm-based error detection
techniques like checksum-based approach in matrix multiplication [29], or techniques for
localizing errors in the execution output of a linear solver, have also been introduced [101].
Unlike all previous approaches described here, both the detectors presented in this
chapter pursue novel research directions. While our first approach is based on the idea
of predicate-abstraction used by Ball to derive novel program coverage metrics [7], our
second approach is based on our observation that during intermediate (e.g., LLVM-level)
code generation, to handle full and partial vectorization, modern compilers exploit (and
explicate in their code documentation) critical invariants.
57
3.6 Discussion
The predicate-abstraction-based detectors require constructing predicate state space
where each state represents concrete values of a collection of boolean predicates at a given
program point of a target program. A set of valid predicate transitions are then profiled by
running the program on a set of training inputs and these valid predicate transitions are
used later for error detection. Clearly, the efficacy of these error detectors are dependent on
the completeness of the valid predicate transitions and the training inputs. In other words,
any valid predicate transition not discovered during profiling phase would be incorrectly
considered as invalid predicate transitions and therefore would lead to false-positives. Also,
these detectors, in general, inherit scalability challenges from the predicate-abstraction
technique. Specifically, the predicate state space grows rapidly with the number of pred-
icates in a program. Therefore, targeting predicate-abstraction-based detectors in large
programs may require employing additional predicate refinement strategies, which are
not in the scope of this dissertation.
3.7 Conclusion
This work first introduced our novel predicate-abstraction-based approach for analyz-
ing resilience of programs. In our approach, we dynamically generate abstract predicate
transition systems for fault-free and faulty executions. Then, we superimpose these sys-
tems in a meaningful way to generate abstract predicate transition diagrams that visualize
fault propagation at the higher, abstract level. Our abstraction seems to often explain at
the high level the empirically measured resilience of algorithms. We then leverage our
predicate-abstraction-based approach to build a simple error detector, and we show its
effectiveness on our set of benchmarks. Next, to make our predicate transition-based
detectors scalable, we implemented our technique as a compiler-level tool called FUSED
to automate the profiling of predicate transitions and insertions of error detector in a target
program. We demonstrated the effectiveness of FUSED by evaluating it on a real-world
example of the SuperLU library. We also presented a preliminary version of a heuristic for
identifying sensitive-code-blocks at the source-code level.
Our other key contribution came in the form of error detectors for detecting control-
flow deviations occurring in vector loops generated by the ISPC compiler. Despite the
flurry of research underway in system resilience, very few solutions (including our past
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contributions) have been adopted and put into practice. The ”sticker shock” of suffering
a flat-out ∼25%–2× overhead (typical figures for various error detectors and dual mod-
ular redundancy) can be unpalatable; a practitioner might prefer going back to an older
lithography, suffering fewer errors (and overhead). The burden of manually inserting
detectors into the source code can also hinder adoption. Finally, the non-availability of
detector types (and even the means for conducting studies) targeting vector instruction
sets and SPMD languages further hinders adoption. While we cannot say that the de-
tection overheads are still within the ballpark of unquestioned acceptance, the detectors
prove to be surprisingly lightweight, can be automatically generated and inserted during
compilation, and may, in the grand scheme of things, provide the right kind and level of
the solution.
CHAPTER 4
EXPLORING THE DESIGN SPACE OF ERROR
DETECTORS IN STENCIL COMPUTATIONS
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 highlighted that several high-performance computing (HPC) applications
involve straight-line code sections with very high arithmetic intensities. For such classes of
applications, control-flow detectors would provide a very limited coverage, and therefore
they must be complemented with other types of detectors capable of providing adequate
coverage. Stencil computations represent one such class of applications which are of-
ten used in the discretized solutions of partial differential equations (PDEs) representing
many important and complex physical simulations such as heat diffusion, computational
fluid dynamics, electromagnetism, seismic wave propagation, etc.
Therefore, we undertake an exploratory work focusing on stencil computations mainly
to assess the complexities involved in building efficient error detectors for such a class of
applications that involve data-intensive computations. We present a feasibility study by
first presenting a novel technique for synthesizing error detectors for stencil computations
by learning the computational patterns using machine learning, and evaluating its effec-
tiveness through a fault-injection-driven study. Our technique involves choosing a subset
of points in a given stencil to learn an approximate kernel which is a computationally
less expensive approximation of the original stencil kernel. We run the approximate kernel
alongside the original stencil kernel and compare their results to infer whether an error
has occurred. Fundamentally, our approach is based on the principal of dual-modulo
redundancy (DMR) where we employ redundant computations to detect errors. However,
the key novelty of our approach is that we propose a machine-learning-based approach
to derive a less expensive approximate kernel to be used for redundant computations.
We demonstrate our technique and the feasibility study using a 25-point reverse-time-
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migration (RTM) stencil [9]. Our specific contributions are:
• A novel approach that uses regression techniques to compute efficient approxima-
tions of a computational kernel used in a stencil computation.
• A systematic way to reduce the size of the training data used for generating regres-
sion models.
• Using a cross-validation-driven approach to estimate sample size, and to select fea-
tures for building efficient error detectors.
• A C++ shared library named SORREL that helps evaluate/extend our technique.
4.2 A Case Study Using 25-point RTM Stencil
We choose a 25-point (RTM) stencil as implemented by McCool et al. [63] as the target
stencil kernel for our case study. This example RTM stencil kernel, shown in Equation 4.1,
uses a finite-difference approximation of the PDE described in Equation 4.2, and is second-
order accurate in time and eighth-order accurate in space. Here, P is a three-dimensional
array and Pn(x, y, z) denotes the value of the pressure wave at coordinates (x, y, z) at time
n, and v is the velocity of pressure wave which is constant for a given medium.
Pn+1(x, y, z) = 2 ∗ Pn(x, y, z)− Pn−1(x, y, z) + v2
{
C0





Ck ∗ (Pn(x + k, y, z)
+ Pn(x− k, y, z) + Pn(x, y + k, z)
+ Pn(x, y− k, z) + Pn(x, y, z + k)

















As shown in Figure 4.1, to calculate Pn+1(x, y, z), the RTM stencil kernel uses the values
of the 25-point RTM stencil from the previous time-step. Our goal is to train a regression
model that predicts the output Pn+1(x, y, z) of a stencil evaluation given one or more of its
inputs. The choice of which inputs to use for model training affects its accuracy and cost.
Table 4.1 lists the choices we evaluate in this study. The output and the selected inputs,
for a given stencil evaluation, together form a feature vector. We train a regression model
on a feature vector by collecting the respective dynamic execution data over multiple
executions using various training inputs. The resulting regression model computes an
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Figure 4.1: A 25-point RTM stencil
Table 4.1: Feature vectors based on 25-Point RTM stencil
Feature Vector Feature List Comments
f1 Pn(x, y, z)
f2 Pn−1(x, y, z)
f3 Pn(x, y, z),Pn−1(x, y, z)
f4
Pn(x, y, z),
Pn(x + 1, y, z),Pn(x− 1, y, z),
Pn(x, y + 1, z), Pn(x, y− 1, z),
Pn(x, y, z + 1),Pn(x, y, z− 1)
f5
Pn(x, y, z),
Pn(x + s1, y, z),Pn(x− s1, y, z),
Pn(x, y + s1, z),Pn(x, y− s1, z),
Pn(x, y, z + s1),Pn(x, y, z− s1) 1 ≤ s1 ≤ 2
f6
Pn(x, y, z),
Pn(x + s2, y, z),Pn(x− s2, y, z),
Pn(x, y + s2, z),Pn(x, y− s2, z),
Pn(x, y, z + s2),Pn(x, y, z− s2) 1 ≤ s2 ≤ 3
f7
Pn(x, y, z),
Pn(x + s3, y, z),Pn(x− s3, y, z),
Pn(x, y + s3, z),Pn(x, y− s3, z),
Pn(x, y, z + s3),Pn(x, y, z− s3) 1 ≤ s3 ≤ 4
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approximation of the RTM stencil kernel, and is used to verify whether the output of the
original kernel is likely to be correct.
When selecting the features on which to train the regression model, our goal is to use
as few inputs of the RTM stencil as possible while accurately approximating its output.
Feature vectors f1, f4, f5, f6 include different subsets of the stencil’s inputs, while vectors
f2 and f3 include the stencil’s output in the preceding time-step. In contrast, vector f7
uses all 25 points in the RTM stencil and serves as an upper bound on the accuracy of
a regression model. Our hypothesis, which is evaluated in the following sections, is that
including more input data will produce a model that is more accurate but more expensive.
As a first step in training a regression model, we collect the data, which we use for
training the regression model, by running the RTM application on randomly generated
inputs. We produce the inputs by randomly varying the parameters such as array size, the
number of time-steps, the value selected to initialize Pn(x, y, z) at time n = 0, and the point
of origin for the pressure wave denoted by Pn(x, y, z) at time n = 0. During an execution of
the stencil program, each point in time and space produces a unique observation. During
the training phase, these observations are used to generate training data.
4.2.1 Sampling Technique
Given a large number of observations generated in the training phase, it is crucial that
we perform sampling to reduce the training data size. As such, we employ stratified
sampling [70] to collect a representative subset of all the collected data that captures the
breadth of the full dataset but is tractable to train on. To sample, we divide the time-
stepped computational data into a finite number of (preferably equal sized) strata. We
then perform a simple random sampling of the computational data belonging to each
stratum having a sample size expressed in Equation 4.3. Here, Sm is the sample size for a
stratum with index m, and Pm is the corresponding population size. The population size
Pm is the size of the complete computational data which belongs to the stratum at index
m. The constant value k is the fraction of the total population size that is sampled.
Sm = k ∗ Pm (4.3)
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4.2.2 Sample Size Estimation
To determine the number of samples necessary to compute an accurate model, we use a
cross-validation-driven approach [74] that is illustrated in Figure 4.2. A target program is
executed under a set of randomly-generated training inputs. Using an initial guess value
for k, the raw computational data is sampled to produce an optimized training dataset. We
perform n-fold cross-validation [53] on the training dataset by training LibSVM [22] on the
training subsets and evaluating it on the test subsets to quantify accuracy. We iterate this
process with the larger values of k until the respective cross-validation accuracy stabilizes.
The smallest possible value of k that provides reasonable cross-validation accuracy is
chosen for generating the regression model.
4.2.3 Regression Analysis
To generate approximate functions, we perform linear regression [5] using each feature
vector listed in Table 4.1. Specifically, we use a linear regression kernel epsilon-SVR [27,
104, 105] implemented in LibSVM software [22]. The generated regression models are
then used by SORREL to compute their corresponding approximate functions. In this
Figure 4.2: Sampler workflow during training phase
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dissertation, we presented a novel approach using linear regression to efficiently approxi-
mate stencil kernels, validating it on the RTM stencil. We showed how the cost of training
the model could be reduced via cross-validation-driven stratified sampling to reduce the
training set size systematically. We also showed how to find a near-optimal threshold
value(τopt) for the detectors using ROC curve analysis and presented the error detection
rate and the overhead data for the detectors. A high error detection rate reported by our
detectors demonstrates the effectiveness of our approach.
In Equation 4.4, Kn(x, y, z) represents a stencil kernel that computes Pn(x, y, z), and
Anfr(x, y, z) is an approximation for Kn(x, y, z), generated through regression analysis us-
ing a feature vector fr. As shown in Equation 4.4,Dnfr(x, y, z) is a boolean detector function.
It returns true if the absolute difference between the observed and the predicted value for
a given stencil computation, represented as |Kn(x, y, z)−Anfr(x, y, z)|, exceeds a threshold
value τ. Table 4.2 quantifies the additional number of operations performed by the detec-
tors as compared to the native version of the RTM stencil kernel shown in Equation 4.1. The
detectors D f1 through D f7 are synthesized using feature vectors f1 through f7, respectively,
as listed in Table 4.1. Operation count mentioned for the detectors is in addition to the
number of operations required by the native computation. As shown later in Section 4.2.7,
the higher cost of detectors D f4 through D f7 relates directly to the larger numbers of RTM
stencil points they use as input.
Dnfr(x, y, z) =
{
true, if |Kn(x, y, z)−Anfr(x, y, z)| > τ.
false, otherwise.
(4.4)





Computation D f1 D f2 D f3 D f4 D f5 D f6 D f7
{∗} 19 1 1 2 7 13 19 25
{+} 25 0 0 1 6 12 18 24
{−} 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
{>} 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
{! =} 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total 45 4 4 6 16 28 40 52
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4.2.4 Threshold Estimation and Detector Accuracy
We now explain the method to determine an optimal or near-optimal value of the thresh-
old (hereafter denoted as τopt) which yields a high error detection rate (true-positives) with
few false-positives. To quantify the impact of τ on these two metrics, we plot a receiver
operator characteristic (ROC) curve [16] for the detectors synthesized using feature vectors
listed in Table 4.1. This curve shows the true-positive and false-positive rates achievable by
each detector across a range of values for τ. For a given number of observations, the
true-positive rate Rtp is calculated using the number of observations with true-positives
(Ntp) and false-negatives (N f n) as shown in Equation 4.5. The false-positive rate R f p is
calculated using the number of observations with false-positives (N f p) and true-negatives
(Ntn) as shown in Equation 4.6.
Rtp =
Ntp
Ntp + N f n
(4.5)
R f p =
N f p
N f p + Ntn
(4.6)
In the current context, an observation represents an instance of a program execution
during which a soft error may or may not occur. If a soft error is witnessed during an
observation and the soft error is successfully flagged by a detector, then the observation
is regarded as a true-positive instance. However, if the detector fails to catch the soft
error, then the observation is a false-negative instance. Conversely, during an error-free
observation, if a detector falsely reports the detection of a soft error, then we treat this
observation as a false-positive instance. If the detector does not flag any error during an
error-free observation, then we call it a true-negative instance.
A ROC curve is obtained by plotting R f p and Rtp against each other using x and y
axes, respectively, across a range values for τ. We select the point on the ROC curve that
gives a high value for Rtp and a low value for R f p. Note that the acceptable values for
Rtp and R f p depend on the magnitude of errors a given application can tolerate, with
some applications being inherently resilient to errors of low magnitude [101, 103]. We
generate our error detectors in two phases. During the initial training phase, we generate
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the approximate stencil function. During the test phase, we select τopt using ROC curve
analysis and evaluate the detector’s effectiveness.
4.2.5 Training Phase
We generate 1000 unique program inputs for the RTM program using SORREL. We use
1% of these inputs in the training phase, and the rest are used during the testing phase.
Each of these training inputs leads to a huge amount of training data, underlining the
need for sampling as explained earlier. The next step is to quantify the distribution of
errors made by each model relative to the real values computed by the RTM stencil. To
this end, we used n-fold cross-validation, where the set of observations (sampled using
stratified sampling as explained in Section 4.2.2) is divided into n disjoint subsets. For
each subset i, we train a model using the remaining n− 1 subsets and compute the error
of the model using subset i as the test data. Finally, we compute the overall error (hereafter
referred as et) by applying the mean-squared-error (MSE) metric on the individual model
errors obtained using each of the n subsets.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the distribution of instances of et obtained using 10 different
observation samples, when using either n = 2 or n = 10 and k = 4e− 5. The data shows
that the instances of et are distributed according to a skew normal distribution, where all
values lie within three standard deviations of the mean (µ ± 3σ). This distribution has
the same shape regardless of the number of folds (n) and other values of k also produce
errors with similar distributions. Having observed a skew normal distribution for the
instances of et, we now represent the accuracy of the corresponding regression model as
an average of the individual values of et in the distribution (hereafter referred as ea). Next,
we determine the appropriate value of k, which controls how sparsely the training data is
sampled. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the different values of ea calculated for the regression
models based on feature vectors f1 through f7 with values of k ranging from 1e − 6 to
1e− 4. As k increases (i.e., more observations are used to train the model), the regression
model’s accuracy (ea) improves until k reaches 4e− 5, after which point it stabilizes. We
thus use k = 4e− 5 for training our models.
Another important point to note is that in our experiments, we fix the stratum size to 60
while performing stratified sampling, which means each stratum represents data from 60




























































































































our experiments. In general, it is expected that the smaller the size of the stratum, the finer
will be the representation of the individual time-steps, leading to a better cross-validation
accuracy.
4.2.6 Error Model
We consider an error model involving a soft error occurring in a CPU’s ALU operations
and live register values. Further, we only consider a subset of the soft errors which
cause SDC in the program output. Therefore, we do not consider all possible program
locations in the RTM kernel for fault injections but rather only inject single-bit errors
into a randomly-selected location in a three-dimensional array used by the stencil for
computations. We perform fault injections at the application-level by instrumenting the
RTM stencil kernel with a function call at the source level. The function is passed a
live value stored at one of the locations of a three-dimensional array used by the RTM
kernel. The function flips a single-bit at a random bit location of the value passed to it and
returns the corrupted value. The array location whose value is chosen for fault injection
is selected at random from the iteration space of the RTM kernel. Specifically, if an RTM
kernel operating on a three-dimensional array with dimensions (x, y, z), and the number
of time-steps for which it runs is t, then the iteration space of the RTM kernel is x × y × z
× t. This approach helps us to focus on our primary goal of studying the efficacy of our
detectors in detecting SDC causing soft errors.
4.2.7 Threshold Selection and Error Detection Rate
To determine τopt, we plot ROC curves using the values of true-positive rate (Rtp) and
false-positive rate (R f p) computed by running two independent experiments. In the first
experiment, we run the RTM kernel under each test input, and a bit-flip is injected during
each run. We obtain the values for Ntp and N f n from this experiment and use these
values to compute Rtp using Equation 4.5. In the second experiment, we repeat all the
steps followed in the first experiment without injecting any error. Using the result of
the second experiment, we obtain N f p and Ntn and use them to compute R f p following
Equation 4.6. We repeat these experiments for different threshold values for each of the
detectors synthesized using feature vectors listed in Table 4.1. The threshold value chosen
for our experiments starts with a small value, and is gradually increased until we achieve
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reasonable true-positive and false-positive rates. Figures 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13
show high values of true-positive and false-positive rates (top-right area) for a low threshold
value of 5. As the threshold value is increased in a fixed step-size of 5, the true-positive rate
decreases at a much slower rate as compared to the false-positive rate, which demonstrates
the effectiveness of these detectors. For a threshold value of 30, the number of false-positives
comes down to zero while still providing a true-positive rate of> 83% for all the detectors.
Figure 4.14 presents the true-positive error detection rate and overhead of each detector.
With a threshold value of τopt = 30, we observe a high error-detection rate (> 85%) with no
false-positives for all the detectors. Detectors which use features f1, f2, f3, and f4 observe
an average overhead of approximately 33%, whereas detectors with higher feature counts
have an average overhead between 54% to 94%. This suggests that the former feature
vectors are the best choice for making applications resilient to errors. Further, the fact
that the addition of features between f1 and f4 has no effect on overhead suggests that
the original cost may not be due to the actual computations that they perform, but rather
other effects such as interference with the key computation’s use of the memory hierarchy.
Figure 4.7: ROC curve for error detectors based on feature vector f1
73
Figure 4.8: ROC curve for error detectors based on feature vector f2
Figure 4.9: ROC curve for error detectors based on feature vector f3
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Figure 4.10: ROC curve for error detectors based on feature vector f4
Figure 4.11: ROC curve for error detectors based on feature vector f5
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Figure 4.12: ROC curve for error detectors based on feature vector f6

































4.2.8 Solution of RTM Using Finite Difference Approximation
In this section, we derive a solution of the RTM PDE of Equation 4.2 which is eighth
order accurate in space and second-order accurate in time. The purpose of this exercise
is to demonstrate that finite-difference approximation gives fewer weight to the farther
points on a stencil with respect to a point for which a new value has to be computed. To
find an eighth order approximation of the second order derivative P(2)(x) in Equation 4.2,
we consider eight nearby points x + 4h,x + 3h,x + 2h,x + h,x − h,x − 2h,x − 3h, and x −
4h. We express P at these points using a Taylor series expanded only up to eighth order
derivative terms as shown by a set of equations in 4.7. Equation 4.7 can be presented as
a set of linear equations in the form Ax = B (assuming h = 1) and the solution can be
presented in the form x = A−1B as shown in Equations 4.8 and 4.9, respectively. From
Equation 4.9, we get second order derivate of P(x) (shown in Equation 4.10) which is
eighth order accurate.














































































































































































































P(x + 4)− P(x)
P(x + 3)− P(x)
P(x + 2)− P(x)






































































































































P(x + 4)− P(x)
P(x + 3)− P(x)
P(x + 2)− P(x)







P(2)(x) = −0.0017{P(x + 4) + P(x− 4)}+ 0.0253{P(x + 3) + P(x− 3)}
− 0.2{P(x + 2) + P(x− 2)}+ 1.6{P(x + 1) + P(x− 1)} − 2.722P(x)
(4.10)
P(2)(n) = {P(n + 1) + P(n− 1)} − 2P(n) (4.11)
Similarly, we can derive second order derivative of P(n) which is second order ac-
curate as shown in Equation 4.11. Equations 4.10 and 4.11 clearly show that the finite-
difference approximation has a natural property of assigning fewer weight to the points
which appear farther on a stencil. Intuitively, this suggests that higher-order stencils
should be more amenable to spatial optimizations when deriving approximate kernel-
based error detectors.
4.3 Related Work
Recently, there has been considerable interest in developing efficient error detectors
for time-stepped stencil computations. The work by Benson et al. [10] proposes running a
cost-effective but unstable solver alongside the main solver and declaring an error when
the results of these solvers disagree beyond a given threshold. Our approach is very
similar to this work, but we extract the secondary solver automatically using machine
learning rather than selecting and implementing it manually for each main solver.
Another recent work by Berrocal et al. [11] uses regression functions to detect runtime
anomalies caused due to soft errors. They use runtime execution data to learn these
regression functions in an on-line fashion to detect anomalies. In contrast, in our approach,
we derive a less-expensive approximate kernel of a stencil kernel as a redundant checker.
Given that we derive the approximate function in a separate step in an off-line fashion,
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it allows us to use more computational data for learning purposes without worrying
about the potential implications on the detection overhead. This helps in maintaining
the accuracy of the learned regression models without adversely impacting the detection
overhead. Also, though not in the scope of this dissertation work, our methodology could
also be used for gaining an understanding of large physical models by learning relations
between inputs and outputs of these models.
Several other promising directions have been pursued towards building soft error de-
tectors. While hardware and architecture-level protections [64, 66, 108] serve as a first line
of defense, we must complement them with more flexible software-level techniques. Sev-
eral software-level techniques employ control-flow-based detectors [72, 107], which rely
on detecting illegal control transitions. These detectors are more suitable for control-flow
rich applications, and less effective for data-intensive applications. Algorithm-based Fault
Tolerance (ABFT) exploits algorithmic properties of a program to detect errors [34,35,101]
but these solutions are problem-specific. In summary, to the best of our knowledge,
none of the previous works employ methods for learning computationally less-expensive
approximate kernels as redundant checkers for stencil computations, which is the key
focus of our work.
4.4 Discussion
The error detection rates reported for the RTM kernel using approximate kernels are
obtained by performing regression analysis on the inputs and the output of the RTM
kernel when executed on a set of training inputs. The training inputs are obtained by
randomizing parameters of an input distribution provided with the RTM kernel imple-
mentation [63] as shown in Figure 4.15. It is important to note that the prediction accuracy
of the derived approximate kernels may or may not be the same for a different input
distribution (e.g., normal distribution). However, the approach presented in this chapter
can further be augmented by parameterizing input distributions as one of the dependent
variables during the regression analysis phase. Similarly, one can also extract a cumulative
distribution function (CDF) for the prediction accuracy of an approximate kernel for a
given input distribution, and the extracted CDF can then be used for threshold estimation.
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initialize_rtm_3d_array(){
for( int z = 0; z < nz; ++z )
for( int y = 0; y < ny; ++y )
for( int x = 0; x < nx; ++x ){
int i = z*ny*nx+y*nx+x;
// randomize c1,c2
float r = (x - nx/c1 + y - ny/c1 + z - nz/c1) / c2;
r = max(c1-r, 0.0f) + c2;
A[1][i] = A[0][i] = r;
}
}
Figure 4.15: A pseudo code for initializing the RTM array
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a novel approach using linear regression to efficiently
approximate stencil kernels, validating it on the RTM stencil. We showed how the cost
of training the model could be reduced via cross-validation-driven stratified sampling to
reduce the training set size systematically. We also showed how to find a near-optimal
threshold value(τopt) for the detectors using ROC curve analysis and presented the error
detection rate and the overhead data for the detectors. A high error detection rate reported
by our detectors demonstrates the effectiveness of our approach. We also showed that
finite-difference approximation has a natural property of assigning fewer weight to farther
points on a stencil. Therefore, in the case of higher-order stencils (such as the 25-point
RTM stencil), we have a greater room for spatial optimization by using a smaller number
of points on a stencil to build highly accurate error detectors. Alternatively, this also high-
lights one potential limitation of our approach that it may not be amenable to lower order
stencils. In summary, through this exploratory work, we demonstrated that it is feasible
to build efficient detectors by deriving lightweight approximations of higher-order stencil
kernels using machine learning.
CHAPTER 5
PROTECTING STRUCTURED ADDRESS
GENERATION FROM SOFT ERRORS
5.1 Introduction
High-performance computing (HPC) applications will soon be running at very high
scales on systems with large component counts. The shrinking dimensions and reducing
power requirements of the transistors used in the memory elements of these massively
parallel systems make them increasingly vulnerable to temporary bit-flips induced by
system noise or high-energy particle strikes. The temporary bit-flips occurring in memory
elements are often referred to as soft errors. Previous studies project an upward trend
in soft-error-induced vulnerabilities in HPC systems, thereby pushing down their mean-
time-to-failure (MTTF) [18,19]. These trends drastically increase the likelihood of a bit-flip
occurring in long-lived computations. Specifically, a bit-flip affecting computational states
of a program under execution such as ALU operations or live register values may lead to
silent data corruption (SDC) in the final program output. Making matters worse, such
erroneous values may propagate to multiple compute nodes in massively parallel HPC
systems [6].
The key focus of the work presented in this chapter is to detect bit-flips affecting ad-
dress computation of array elements. For example, to load a value stored in an array A at
an index i, a compiler must first compute the address of the location referred by the index
i. A compiler performs this operation under-the-hood by using the base address of A and
adding to it an offset value computed using the index i. This style of address generation
scheme, which uses a base address and an offset to generate the destination address, is
often referred to as the structured address generation. Accordingly, the computations done in
the context of structured address generation are referred to as structured address computations.
Often, computational kernels used in HPC applications involve array accesses inside
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loops, thus requiring structured address computations. For these kernels, there is a real
chance of one of their structured address computations getting affected by a bit-flip. A
structured address computation pertaining to an array, when subjected to a bit-flip, may
produce an incorrect address that still refers to a valid address in the address space of the
array. Using the value stored at this incorrect but valid address may lead to SDC without
causing a program-crash or any other user-detectable-errors.
In this work, we demonstrate that the bit-flips affecting structured address computations
for the above class of computational kernels lead to nontrivial SDC rates. Also, we present
a novel technique for detecting bit-flips impacting structured address computations. Given
that the structured address computations involve arithmetic operations that use a CPU’s com-
putational resources, we consider an error model where bit-flips affect ALU operations
and CPU register files. We assume DRAM and cache memory to be error-free, a reasonable
assumption because they are often protected using ECC mechanisms [23, 51, 52, 100]. We
further limit the scope of our error model by considering only ALU operations and register
values that correspond to structured address computations.
Specifically, we make the following contributions in this work:
1. We perform a fault injection driven study on ten benchmarks drawn from the Poly-
Bench/C benchmark suite [83] demonstrating that structured address computations in
these benchmarks when subjected to bit-flips, lead to nontrivial SDC rates.
2. We present a novel scheme that employs instruction-level rewriting of the address
computation logic used in structured address computations. This rewrite preserves an
error in a structured address computation by intentionally corrupting all structured
address computations that follow it. This requires the creation of a dependency-chain
between all structured address computations of a given array. The introduction of a
dependency-chain enables the flow of error which helps in the following ways:
(a) Strategic Placement of Error Detectors: Instead of checking each and every
structured address computations for soft errors (which is prohibitively expensive), we
strategically place our error detectors at the end of a dependency-chain.
(b) Promoting SDCs to Program-crashes: By enabling the flow of error in address
computation logic, we increase the chances of promoting an SDC to a program-crash
(that is more easily detected).
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3. We present a methodology for implementing our proposed scheme as a compiler-
level technique called PRESAGE (PRotEcting Structured Address GEneration). Specif-
ically, we have implemented PRESAGE using LLVM compiler infrastructure [55,58]
as a transformation pass. LLVM preserves the pointer-related information at LLVM
intermediate representation (IR) level (as also highlighted in recent works [69, 110])
while providing access to a rich set of application programming interfaces (APIs) for
seamlessly implementing PRESAGE transformations. This is the key reason behind
choosing LLVM as the tool-of-choice.
In summary, our error-detection approach is based on the following principle:
The larger the fraction of system state an error corrupts, the easier it is to detect.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 explains the key idea
through a set of small examples. Section 5.3 formally introduces the key concepts and the
methodology used to implement PRESAGE. In Section 5.4, we provide a detailed analysis
of the experiments carried out to measure the efficacy of PRESAGE. Section 5.5 provides a
literary review of the closely related work done in this area. Section 5.6 discusses the pros
and cons of the PRESAGE technique. Finally, Section 5.7 summarizes the key takeaways
and future directions for this work.
5.2 Motivating Example
Figure 5.1 presents a simple C function foo1 performing store operations to even-
indexed memory locations of an array a[] of size 2n inside a for loop. It also stores the last
accessed array address into a variable addr at the end of every loop-iteration. Figure 5.2
represents the corresponding x86 code emitted for the foo1 function when compiled using
clang compiler with O1 optimization level. Registers %esi and %ecx represent the variable
n and the loop iterator i of the function foo1, whereas registers %rdi and %rax correspond
L0 : void foo1 ( double∗ a , unsigned n ){
L1 : double∗ addr=a ;
L2 : f o r ( i n t i =1 ; i<n ; i ++){
L3 : i n t id =2∗ i −2;
L4 : addr=&a [ id ] ;
L5 : ∗addr= i ;
}
}
Figure 5.1: An example function foo1()
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L0 : cmp 0x2 ,% e s i
L1 : j l L12
L2 : xor %eax ,%eax
L3 : mov 0x1 ,% ecx
L4 : xorps %xmm0,%xmm0
L5 : c v t s i 2 s d %ecx ,%xmm0
L6 : c l t q
L7 : movsd %xmm0,(% rdi ,%rax , 8 )
L8 : add 0x2 ,%eax
L9 : inc %ecx
L10 : cmp %ecx ,% e s i
L11 : j n e L4
L12 : r e t q
Figure 5.2: An x86 representation of the example function foo()
to the array’s base address and index, respectively. In every loop iteration, a destina-
tion array address is computed by the expression (%rdi,%rax,0x8) which evaluates to
(0x8*%rax +%rdi), the value in register %rax is incremented by 2, and the base address
stored in %rdi remains fixed. It is worth noting that the final address computation denoted
by the expression (%rdi,%rax,0x8) is not user-visible and is something the compiler does
under-the-hood.
In contrast to the fixed base address (FBA) scheme used in function foo1, function
foo2 (shown in Figure 5.3), a semantically equivalent version of foo1, introduces a novel
relative base address (RBA) scheme. Specifically, foo2 uses an array address computed
in a loop iteration (addr) as the new base address for the next loop iteration along with
a relative index (rid) as shown in Figure 5.1. This simple but powerful scheme cre-
ates a dependency-chain in the address computation logic as the computation of any
new address would depend on the last computed address. Therefore, our RBA scheme
guarantees that if an address computation of an array element gets corrupted, then all
subsequent address computations would also become erroneous. This, in turn, enables
us to strategically place error detectors at a handful of places in a program (preferably at
all program exit points), thereby making the whole error detection process lightweight.
For example, in functions foo1 and foo2, the address of a new array element, computed
during every loop iteration, is stored in the variable addr. The value stored in the variable
addr may get corrupted in following scenarios:
• Error Scenario I: A bit-flip occurs in the value stored in the loop-iterator variable i
in functions foo1 and foo2.
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L0 : void foo2 ( double ∗a , i n t n ){
L1 : double∗ addr=a ;
L2 : i n t pid =0;
L3 : f o r ( i n t i =1 ; i<n ; i ++){
L4 : i n t id =2∗ i −2;
L5 : i n t r i d=id−pid ;
L6 : addr [ r i d ]= i ;
L7 : pid=id ;
L8 : addr=&addr [ r i d ] ;
}
}
Figure 5.3: An example function foo2()
• Error Scenario II: A bit-flip affects the value stored in the absolute index variable id
in functions foo1 and foo2.
• Error Scenario III: A bit-flip occurs in the value stored in the relative index variable
rid, which is only present in the function foo2.
• Error Scenario IV: A bit-flip affecting the value stored in the variable addr in func-
tions foo1 and foo2.
The above program-level sites are listed in Table 5.1 for easy reference. With respect to the
error scenario IV, it is evident that only in the case of foo2, when the result of final address
computation stored in addr is corrupted during one of the loop iterations, all subsequent
address computations in the remaining loop iterations would also get corrupted due to the
dependency-chain introduced in the address computation logic. We further demonstrate
the behavior of these dependency-chains, introduced by our RBA scheme, through a small
set of fault injection driven experiments. Figure 5.4 presents the result of two independent
runs for function foo1. The X-axis shows the number of loop iteration whereas the Y-axis
Table 5.1: List of fault sites in functions foo1 and foo2
Fault Site Description
i Loop iterator variable.
id Absolute index variable.
addr
A variable containing an address of a
location in the array a[].
rid
Relative index variable (only present in
foo2).
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Figure 5.4: Function foo1 with no dependency-chains
shows the value stored in the variable addr. The execution with label foo1 addr represents
a fault-free execution of foo1.
The execution with label foo1 addr corrupt represents a faulty execution of foo1
where a single bit fault is introduced at bit position 6 of the value stored in addr during
the tenth loop iteration. Similarly, Figure 5.5 presents the result of two independent runs
for function foo2 such that a single bit fault is introduced at bit position 6 of the value
stored in addr during the first loop iteration in the faulty execution represented by the
label foo2 addr corrupt. We can clearly notice that only in the case of function foo2,
once an address value stored in addr gets corrupted, all subsequent address values stored
in addr are also corrupted.
5.3 Methodology
Section 5.2 demonstrates that a simple rewrite of the address computation logic intro-
duces a dependency-chain, thereby enabling the flow of error. Given that the address com-
putation is often done in a user-transparent manner by the compiler, we implement our
technique at the compiler-level. Specifically, we choose the LLVM compiler infrastructure
to implement our technique as a transformation pass (here on referred to as PRESAGE)
which works on LLVM’s intermediate representation (IR).
Our implementation eliminates the need for any manual effort from programmers,
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Figure 5.5: Function foo2 with a dependency-chain introduced
thereby allowing our technique to scale to nontrivial programs. LLVM’s intermediate rep-
resentation (IR) provides a special instruction called getelementptr (here on referred as
GEP for brevity) for performing address computation of Aggregate types including Array
type1. Therefore, all analyses implemented as part of PRESAGE are centered around
the GEP instruction. Table 5.2 presents the glossary of terms that are referred to in the
remaining sections of this chapter. A GEP instruction requires a base address, one or
more index values, and the size of an element to compute an address, often referred to as
structured address. Given the key focus of our work is to protect these structured addresses,
the definition of an array on which PRESAGE transformations are applied closely follows
the LLVM’s Array type definition with some restrictions as explained below:
• Definition 1: An array in this work always refers to a contiguous arrangement of
elements of the same type laid out linearly in the memory.
• Definition 2: All structured address computations protected using PRESAGE must
always use only one index for address computations. It is important to note that
this is needed only to simplify the implementation and does not limit the scope
of PRESAGE as multidimensional arrays can be easily represented using single-






A target function on which PRESAGE
transformations are applied.
b
A base address with at least one user
in the target function.
B A basic block in the target function.
E(B1,B2)
A boolean function which returns true
only if an edge exists from B1 to B2.
LBp(B)
A set of all immediate predecessor basic
blocks of B.
LBs(B)
A set of all immediate successor basic
blocks of B.
LBe(F )
A set of all exit basic blocks
in the target function F .
Lb(F )
A set of all immutable base addresses
in F .
LG(B, b)
A set of all GEP instructions in B which
use the base address b.
Mφ
A two-level nested hashmap with first key
a basic block, second key a base address
mapped to a phi node.
MG
A two-level nested hashmap with first key
a basic block, second key a base address
mapped to a GEP instruction.
indexed scheme. For example, a two-dimensional array could be laid out linearly
in memory by traversing it in row-major or column-major fashion.
• Definition 3: The base addresses used in all structured address computations pro-
tected by PRESAGE must not be updated. For example, if a PRESAGE transforma-
tion is applied to a callee function to protect its structured address computations,
then the callee function must not mutate the base addresses referenced in structured
address computations protected by PRESAGE.
5.3.1 Error Model
We consider an error model where soft errors induce a single-bit fault affecting CPU
register files and ALU operations. We assume that memory elements such as data cache
and DRAM are error-free because they are usually protected using ECC mechanisms. We
implement our error model by targeting runtime instances of LLVM IR-level instructions
of a target function for fault injection.
For example, if there are N dynamic IR-level instructions observed corresponding to a
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target function, then we choose one out of N dynamic instructions with a uniform random
probability of 1N and flip the value of a randomly chosen bit of the destination virtual
register, i.e., the left-hand side of the randomly chosen dynamic instruction. Similar error
models have been proposed in the past for various resilience studies and it provides a
reasonable estimate of the application-level resiliency of an application [59, 97]. Given
that our focus is to study soft errors affecting structured address computation, we consider
all fault sites which when subjected to a random single-bit bit-flip may affect the output
of one or more GEP instructions of a target program. Specifically, we propose the two
following error models which mainly differ in the dynamic fault site selection strategy.
5.3.1.1 Error Model I
As described in Section 5.2, error scenarios affecting structured addressed computations
are broadly categorized into soft errors affecting index values and the final output of GEP
instructions. Error model I considers the scenario where index values are corruption-free,
but the final output of one of the GEP instruction has a random single-bit corruption. This
is done by randomly choosing from dynamic instances of all GEP instructions of a target
function and injecting a bit-flip in the final address computed the GEP instruction.
5.3.1.2 Error Model II
Error model II considers the case where the index value of one of the dynamic instances
of GEP instructions is corrupted including the dynamic fault sites corresponding to the
set of def-use leading to the index-value.
The above two error models are implemented using an open-source and publicly avail-
able fault injector tool VULFI [4, 95]. Also, note that in our error models, we do not target
base addresses as these are small in numbers (one per array) and can be easily protected
through replication without incurring severe performance or space overhead.
5.3.2 PRESAGE Transformations
We refer to two or more GEP instructions as same-class GEPs if they use the same base
address. PRESAGE creates a dependency-chain between same-class GEPs in a two-stage
process.
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5.3.2.1 Inter-Block Dependency Chains
The first stage involves enabling dependency-chains between same-class GEPs in differ-
ent basic blocks. Intuitively, it would require first GEP, for a given base address, appearing
in all basic blocks be transformed in a manner such that it uses the address computed by
the last same-class GEP in its predecessor basic block as the relative base. However, we need
a bit more careful analysis as a basic block may have more than one predecessor basic
blocks. Moreover, it might be possible that not all predecessor blocks have a same-class
GEP or a predecessor block might be a back edge (i.e., there is a loop enclosing the basic
block and its predecessor basic block). Therefore, we propose a three-step process for
linking same-class GEPs in different basic blocks as explained by Figures 5.6 and 5.7. As a
first step, as shown in Figure 5.6, we iterate over all basic blocks of a target function F in
a breadth-first order. In a given basic block B with an incoming edge count e, we insert
a phi node for each unique base address appearing in Lb(F ) for selecting a value from
same-class incoming GEP values (each belonging to a unique predecessor basic block). For
a given base address b, the respective phi node entry is used as the relative base by the first
GEP (with base b) in the current basic block B. In case B does not have a valid GEP entry for
b , then we call B a pass-through basic block with respect to b. In this case, we simply pass
the phi node value to the successor basic blocks. We use a phi node because all PRESAGE
transformations are applied at LLVM IR and LLVM uses the single static assignment (SSA)
form, thus requiring a phi node to select a value from one or more incoming values. For
1: CreateInterBlkDepChain(F ,MG,Mφ) {
2: for all B in BFS(F ) {
3: e← GetIncomingEdgeCount(B)
4: for all b in Lb(F ) {
5: φ← CreateEmptyPHINode(b,e)
6: InsertPHINodeEntry(B,b,φ,Mφ)
7: for all Bp in LBp(B) {
8: if HasGEP(Bp,b,MG) {







Figure 5.6: PRESAGE algorithm for creating inter-block dependency-chains
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1: UpdateInterBlkDepChain(F ,Mφ,MG ,P) {
2: for all B in BFS(F ) {
3: for all Bp in LBp(B) {
4: for all b in Lb(F ) {
5: s← ¬HasGEP(Bp,b,MG)
6: s← s ∧ HasPHI(Bp,b,Mφ)
7: s1 ← s ∧ ¬IsBackEdge(Bp,B)
8: s1 ← s1 ∧ (P = Pass1)
9: s2 ← s ∧ IsBackEdge(Bp,B)
10: s2 ← s2 ∧ (P = Pass2)
11: if s1 ∨ s2 {
12: φ← GetPHINode(B,b,Mφ)







Figure 5.7: PRESAGE algorithm for updating inter-block dependency-chains
each phi node entry created in B, if valid incoming GEP values are available from one or
more predecessor basic blocks, the phi node is updated with those values by calling the
SetIncomingEdge routine. At this point, we already have created phi node entries in each
basic block (including all pass-through basic blocks), and have populated these phi nodes
with incoming GEP values wherever applicable. As the next step, as shown in Figure 5.7,
for a basic block B with each of its pass-through predecessor basic block with respect to a
base address b, the respective phi node φ is updated with the predecessor’s phi node
entry φp by calling SetIncomingEdge routine. If a back-edge exists from a pass-through
predecessor basic block Bp to B (i.e., there exists a loop enclosing B and Bp) then B may
receive invalid data from Bp as Bp is also a successor basic block of B. Therefore, we
invoke the procedure UpdateInterBlkDepChain in Figure 5.7 twice. In the first pass, the
phi node entries of all pass-through predecessor basic blocks of B, which do not have back
edges to B, are assigned to the respective phi node entries in B. In the second pass, we
repeat the steps of the first pass with the exception that this time, we select the phi node
entries of all pass-through predecessor basic blocks of B which do have back edges to B.
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5.3.2.2 Intra-Block Dependency Chains
The second stage involves creating intra-block dependency-chains. As shown in Fig-
ure 5.8, for each basic block B of a target function F and for each unique base address b
∈ Lb(B), if there exist one or more same-class GEP instructions which use b as the base, we
need to transform these GEPs to create a dependency-chain. In other words, each GEP uses
the value computed by the previous GEP as the relative base using our RBA scheme. For the
first occurrence of GEP instruction in B with base b, we extract the relative base information
using the phi node entry φ created in the previous stage. At runtime, the phi node φ will
receive the last address computed using the base address b from one of the predecessor
basic blocks of B. In summary, for each GEP instruction G, an equivalent version Gn is
created using the relative base and the relative index values. All uses of G are then replaced
by Gn and G is then finally deleted.
5.3.3 Detector Design
The error detectors are designed to protect against single-bit faults injected using error
model I. As shown in Figure 5.9, in each exit basic block Be, for each unique base address
b, PRESAGE makes available the value computed of the last run GEP instruction with
base b and the relative index value used. Additionally, PRESAGE also makes available the
absolute index value which along with the base address b can also be used to reproduce the
output of the last run GEP instruction with base b. The error detectors then simply check
if the output G produced by the last run GEP instruction matches the recomputed value
Gd using the base address b and the absolute index value. Given that in error model I, we
consider the base address and index value to be corruption free, the error detectors are
precise with respect to error model I as they do not report any false positives.
Figure 5.10 shows the LLVM-level control-flow graph (CFG) of the function foo1 pre-
sented in Section 5.2. Similarly, Figure 5.11 shows the LLVM-level CFG of the PRESAGE
transformed version of the function foo1. The GEP instruction in function foo1 (Fig-
ure 5.10) which stores the computed address in register %13 is replaced by a new GEP
instruction (Figure 5.11) in the PRESAGE transformed version of foo1 which uses rela-
tive base and relative index value for address computation. The PRESAGE transformed
version of foo1 in Figure 5.10 also has error detector code inserted in the exit basic block.
Specifically, %GEP duplct represents the recomputed version of the address which is com-
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1: CreateIntraBlkDepChain(F ,MG,Mφ) {
2: for all B in BFS(F ) {
3: for all b in Lb(F ) {
4: for all G in LG(B, b) {
5: if IsFirstGEP(G) {
6: φ← GetPHINode(B,b,Mφ)














Figure 5.8: PRESAGE algorithm for creating intra-block dependency-chains
1: InsertDetectors(F ,MG,Mφ) {
2: for all Be in LBe(F ) {
3: for all b in Lb {
4: φ← GetPHINode(B,b,Mφ)
5: br ← GetRelativeBase(φ,b)
6: rid← GetRelativeIdx(φ)
7: pid← GetPrevIdx(φ)
8: G ← CreateNewGEP(br,rid)





Figure 5.9: PRESAGE algorithm for error detection
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Figure 5.10: CFG representation of the function foo1
Figure 5.11: CFG representation of PRESAGE transformed version of the function foo1
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pared against the observed address value %GEP obsrvd. In case of a mismatch, the global
variable @detect-Counter is set to report error detection to the end user.
5.4 Experimental Results
5.4.1 Evaluation Strategy
Our evaluation strategy involves measuring the effectiveness of the proposed error
detectors in terms of SDC detection rate and performance overhead. Also, we analyze
the impact of PRESAGE transformations on an application’s resiliency using a fault in-
jection driven study. We consider ten benchmarks (listed in Table 5.3) drawn from the
PolyBench/C benchmark suite [82].
These benchmarks represent a diverse set of applications from areas such as stencils,
algebraic kernels, solvers, and BLAS routines. For each of these benchmarks, we perform
four set of experiments, summarized in Table 5.4. Each experiment set involves 100 fault





(in millions) SIC-I SIC-II
Total
SIC %SI-I %SI-II
adi 59.2 157.5 30 69 161 18.6% 42.8%
fdtd-2d 63.7 24.8 68 98 249 27.3% 39.3%
seidel-2d 74.8 36.8 42 114 180 23.3% 63.3%
jacobi-2d 64.2 97.1 56 112 196 28.5% 57.1%
gesummv 0.4 0.7 5 5 22 22.7% 22.7%
trmm 39.1 107.1 14 39 90 15.5% 43.3%
atax 0.5 0.7 22 26 91 24.1% 28.5%
bicg 0.4 0.7 5 5 23 21.7% 21.7%
cholesky 0.3 0.8 16 39 89 17.9% 43.8%
lu 0.6 1.9 15 35 77 19.4% 45.4%
Table 5.4: Summary of experiments
Experiment Set Description
Native FIC EM-I
A fault-injection campaign (FIC)
using error model I on the native
version of a target benchmark.
Native FIC EM-II
Same as Native FIC EM-I except
that error model II is used.
Presage FIC EM-I
A fault-injection campaign (FIC)
using error model I on benchmarks
transformed using PRESAGE.
Presage FIC EM-II
Same as Presage FIC EM-I except
that error model II is used.
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injection campaigns (FIC) where each FIC comprises 50 independent fault injection runs.
The crash rate calculated for each fault injection campaign is considered as a unique random
sample. Our approach is to run a sufficient number of fault injection campaigns until: (1) the
sample distribution becomes normal or near-normal; and (2) for a target confidence level of
95%, the margin of error for the distribution falls within the range of ±3.5%. We observe
that for each benchmark, running 100 fault injection campaigns under each experiment set
is sufficient to achieve a 95% confidence level with a margin of error of ±3.5%.
In each experimental run, we carry out a fault-free and a faulty execution of a target
benchmark using identical program input parameters and compare the outcome of the
two executions. The program input parameters (such as array size used in the benchmark)
are randomly chosen from a predefined range of values. During a fault-free execution,
no faults are injected, whereas during a faulty execution, a single-bit fault is injected in a
dynamic LLVM IR instruction selected randomly using either error model I or error model
II as explained in Section 5.3.
Note that we only target the key function(s) that implement the core logic of a bench-
mark for fault injection. For example, in the jacobi-2d benchmark, we only target the
kernel jacobi 2d which implements the core Jacobi kernel and ignore the other auxiliary
functions such as the function used for array initialization or the program’s main().
Given that the benchmarks chosen produce one or more result arrays as the final pro-
gram output, we compare respective elements of the result arrays produced by the faulty
and fault-free executions to categorize the outcome of the experimental run as:
• SDC: The executions ran to completion, but the corresponding elements of the result
arrays of the fault-free and faulty execution are not equivalent.
• Benign: The corresponding elements of the result arrays of the fault-free and faulty
execution are equivalent.
• Program-crash: The program crashes or terminates prematurely without producing
the final output.
We analyze the impact of PRESAGE transformations on an application’s resiliency by
comparing the outcomes of the experiment sets Native FIC EM I with Presage FIC EM-I,
and Native FIC EM-II with Presage FIC EM-II.
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5.4.2 Fault Injection Campaigns
Figure 5.12 shows the result of FIC done under each experiment set listed in Table 5.4.
Each column in the figure represents 100 FIC where each FIC consists of 50 runs. There-
fore, the total number of fault injections done across 10 benchmarks and 4 experiment sets
stand at 0.2 million (4 experiment sets × 10 benchmarks × 5000 fault injections).
• Nontrivial SDC Rates: The results for experiment sets Native FIC EM-I and Na-
tive FIC EM-II shown in Figure 5.12 demonstrate that nontrivial SDC rates are ob-
served when structured address computations are subjected to bit-flips. Specifically,
for the experiment set Native FIC EM-I, we observe a maximum and a minimum
SDC rate of 32.2% and 18.5%, for the benchmarks trmm and bicg, respectively. In
the case of Native FIC EM-II, we observe a greater contrast, with maximum SDC
rate of 43.6% and a minimum SDC rate of 2.3% for the benchmarks trmm and adi,
respectively.
• Promotion of SDCs to Program-crashes: When comparing the results of experiment
sets Presage FIC EM-I and Presage FIC EM-II with that of Native FIC EM-I and
Native FIC EM-II, we observe that PRESAGE transformations lead to a sizable frac-
tion of SDCs getting promoted to program-crashes. Specifically, Presage FIC EM-I
reports an average increase of 12.5% (averaged across all ten benchmarks) in the
number of program crashes when compared to Native FIC EM-I, with a maximum
increase of 19.3% reported for the cholesky benchmark. Similarly, Presage FIC EM-
II reports an average increase of 7.8% (averaged across all ten benchmarks) in the
number of program crashes when compared to Native FIC EM-II with a maximum
increase of 16.8% reported for the jacobi-2d benchmark.
5.4.3 Detection Rate and Performance Overhead
Figure 5.13 shows the percentage of SDCs reported in Figure 5.12 under Presage FIC EM-
I that are detected by the PRESAGE-inserted error detectors. Except for the benchmark
fdtd-2d, we are able to detect 100% of the SDCs caused by a random bit-flip injected using
error model I. In case of fdtd-2d, we are able to detect only 74% of the reported SDCs
because a fraction of GEP instructions in fdtd-2d have mutable base addresses. Recall that




























Figure 5.13: SDC detection rate and performance overhead
base addresses. For the benchmarks adi, seidel-2d, gesummv, bicg, and cholesky, we
notice that the error detectors incur almost negligible overheads ranging between 0.3%
and 3.2%. Benchmarks lu and atax report overhead figures of less than 20%, whereas the
benchmarks jacobi-2d, fdtd-2d, trmm, and atax report overhead figures of close to 40%.
5.4.4 False Positives and False Negatives
We refer to the errors flagged during the execution of a PRESAGE-transformed pro-
gram as a false positive when no faults are injected during the execution. Conversely, if
there are no errors reported during the execution of a PRESAGE-transformed program
while an error is injected during the execution, we regard it as a false negative. The
basic philosophy of the PRESAGE detectors is to recompute the final address observed
at the end point of a dependency-chain and compare the recomputed address against
the observed final address. Also, in error model I, the index and the base address of
a GEP instruction are assumed to be corruption-free, but the final address computed by
it can be erroneous. Therefore, under error model I, whenever the recomputed address
does not match the observed address, it attributes it to an actual bit-flip. In summary,
the detectors never report false positives under error model I. Even in the case of error
model II, where we subject the index value of a GEP instruction to a bit-flip, the value
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recomputed by the detectors would use the same corrupted index value to reproduce the
same corrupted observed value. Thus even under error model II, the error detectors must
not report false positives. However, it may report false negatives, including in cases where
we inject bit-flips into GEP instructions that have mutable base addresses, as in the case of
the fdtd-2d benchmark.
5.4.5 Coverage Analysis
Table 5.3 provides an insight into the kind of coverage provided by the PRESAGE-
based error detectors. Total SIC denotes the total static instruction count of the LLVM IR
instructions corresponding to core functions that we target for fault injections in a bench-
mark. SIC-I and SIC-II represent the subset of instructions represented by SIC chosen us-
ing error models I and II, respectively. Apparently, SIC-I and SIC-II represent a significant
portion of SIC with the share of SIC-I ranging between 15.5% and 28.5%, whereas that
of SIC-II ranges between 63.3% and 21.7%. The ratio between SIC-I and SIC-II roughly
varies from 1:3 (in case of seidel-2d) to 1:1 (in case of gesummv and bicg). Avg. DIC-I is
a counterpart of SIC-I, representing the average dynamic instruction count averaged over
DIC observed during each experimental run of an FIC done under the experiment set
Native FIC EM-I. Similarly, Avg. DIC-II denotes the average dynamic instruction count
averaged over DIC observed during each experimental run of an FIC done under the
experiment set Native FIC EM-II. Clearly, the fault sites considered under error model I
and II constitute a significant part of the overall static instruction count of the benchmarks
considered in our experiments.
5.5 Related Work
Previous work by Casas-Guix et al. [20] shows that an Algebraic Multigrid (AMG)
solver is relatively immune to faults and can, often, recover to an acceptable final answer
even after encountering a momentary bit-flip in the data state. However, they realize that
any fault in the space of pointers often wreaks havoc, since the corrupted pointers tend to
write data values into unintended memory spaces. As a solution, they propose the use of
pointer triplication, which not only helps detect errors in the value of a pointer variable
but also correct the same. Unfortunately, pointer triplication comes with a high overhead
of runtime checks. Also, they do not focus on the scenarios where corruptions in structured
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address computations lead to SDC, which is the key focus of our work.
Another work by Wei et al. [110] highlights the difference between the results of the
fault injection experiments done using a higher-level fault injector LLFI targeting instruc-
tions at LLVM IR-level, and a lower-level, PIN-based, fault injector performing fault in-
jections at x86-level. This work highlights that LLVM offers a separate instruction called
getElementPtr for carrying out structured address computations whereas, at x86-level, the
same instruction can be used for computing address as well as performing non-address
arithmetic computations. Another recent work by Nagarakatte et al. [69] shows how, by
associating meta-data and by using Intel’s recently introduced MPX instructions, one can
guard C/C++ programs against pointer-related memory attacks. The key portion of this
work is also implemented using LLVM infrastructure. The above two works, in a way,
influenced our decision to choose LLVM for implementing PRESAGE.
Researchers have also explored the development of application-level error detectors
for detecting soft errors affecting a program’s control states [50, 72, 96]. Another criti-
cal area in application-level resilience is algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT), which
exploits algorithmic properties of well-known applications to derive efficient error detec-
tors [101, 102]. Researchers have also focused in the past to optimize the placement of
application-level error detectors at strategic program points.The information about these
strategic locations is usually derived through well-established static and dynamic pro-
gram analysis techniques [32,38,75,92]. To the best of our knowledge, none of the previous
works have focused on protecting structured address generation leading to SDC, the focus
of our work.
5.6 Discussion
We have conducted preliminary investigations on the elevated overhead figures associ-
ated with some of our benchmarks. A significant portion of these overheads is attributable
to the core PRESAGE transformations that introduce dependency-chains. In general, such
serial dependence chains can cause: (i) increased register pressure leading to register
spills, and (ii) potential loss in optimization opportunities such as vectorization. Register
pressure escalations can, in general, be expected due to structured address computations
in a basic block requiring a previously computed address from one of its predecessor
basic blocks. An added side effect of such dependency-chains can be the elimination of
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vectorization opportunities.
We provide here a summary of our envisaged approaches to mitigate these limitations.
One approach is to split dependency-chains into shorter chains, striking a good balance
between detection rates and overhead. Another approach is to create dependency-chains
across instruction accesses situated a certain stride apart; this has the potential to retain
a sufficient amount of exposed instruction-level parallelism while also creating address
calculation chains. Last but not least, it appears worthwhile to investigate how the advan-
tages of vectorization and dependency-chains can be obtained simultaneously.
5.7 Conclusion
Researchers in the HPC community have highlighted the growing need for develop-
ing cross-layer resilience solutions with application-level techniques gaining a prominent
place due to their inherent flexibility. Developing efficient and lightweight error detec-
tors have been a central theme of application-level resilience research dealing with silent
data corruption. Through this work, we argue that, often, protecting structured address
computations is important due to their vulnerability to bit-flips, resulting in nontrivial SDC
rates. We experimentally support this argument by carrying out fault injection driven
experiments on ten well-known benchmarks. We witness SDC rates ranging between
18.5% and 43.6% when instructions in these benchmarks pertaining to structured address
computations are subjected to bit-flips.
Next, guided by the principle that maximizing the propagation of errors would make
them easier to detect, we introduce a novel approach for rewriting the address compu-
tation logic used in structured address computations. The rewriting scheme, dubbed the
RBA scheme, introduces a dependency chain in the address computation logic, enabling
sufficient propagation of any error and, thus allowing efficient placement of error de-
tectors. Another salient feature of this scheme is that it promotes a fraction of SDCs
(user-invisible) to program-crashes (user-visible). One can argue that promoting SDCs
to program-crashes may lead to a bad user experience. However, a program-crash is far
better than an SDC, whose insidious nature does not raise any user alarms while silently
invalidating the program output.
We have implemented our scheme as a compiler-level technique called PRESAGE
developed using the LLVM compiler infrastructure. In Section 5.3, we formally presented
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the key steps involved in implementing the PRESAGE transformations which include
creating inter-block and intra-block dependency-chains, and a lightweight detector placed
strategically at all exit points of a program. We reported high detection rates ranging
between 74% and 100% with the performance overhead ranging between 0.3% and 42.8%
across ten benchmarks. When faults are injected using error model I, the PRESAGE-
transformed benchmarks witness an average and a maximum increase of 12.5% and 19.3%,
respectively, in program-crashes as compared to their original versions. These figures
stand at 7.8% and 16.8%, respectively, when error model II is used instead of error model
I for fault injection.
Our current work identifies some challenges we plan to address as part of the fu-
ture work. Specifically, we observe relatively higher detection overheads for some of
the benchmarks, potentially due to increased register pressure and loss in vectorization
opportunities due to the introduction of dependency-chains as explained earlier. In the
future, we plan to explore efficient ways of mining GEP instructions in a program that
are best suited for PRESAGE transformations and also vectorize the dependency-chains
(wherever possible) to minimize the performance impact. Although the primary focus
of our work is to provide coverage explicitly for error model I, we also observe that
PRESAGE provides partial coverage for error model II by promoting a fraction of SDCs
to program-crashes. As future work, we plan to explore techniques used in the context
of verification and polyhedral transformations to develop comprehensive error detection
mechanisms for error model II. Finally, through this work, we hope to bring to the re-
silience community’s notice the importance and the need for developing efficient error
detectors for protecting structured address computations.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this dissertation work, we started with highlighting the need for efficient evalua-
tion infrastructures capable of implementing various error models requiring simulation
of soft errors. To this end, we developed two LLVM-level fault injectors, KULFI and
VULFI, targeting scalar and vector architectures, respectively. Our developmental efforts
were mainly triggered by the lack of publicly available fault injectors suiting our research
requirements at that time. We also contributed to the system resilience community by
making both the tools open-source. Our next key contribution focused on developing
efficient error detectors capable of detecting control-flow deviations. The idea is built
on the tenets of a well-known formal technique called predicate-abstraction. To make
these detectors scalable, we further developed a compiler-level tool named FUSED which
facilitates the automatic deployment of these control-flow detectors.
Next, driven by the curiosity of developing efficient error detectors for a class of HPC
applications involving data-intensive computations which are not control-flow rich in na-
ture, we carried out a case study on a 25-point RTM stencil kernel to explore the feasibility
of deriving computationally less expensive approximate kernels using machine learning,
to be used as redundant checkers for detecting errors in stencil computations. The study
presented some key finding such as the suitability of using approximate kernels as check-
ers only for higher-order stencils. Our most recent work focuses on protecting structured
address computation by presenting a novel relative base addressing (RBA) scheme. This
scheme enables the flow of errors in structured address computation logic, thus helping in
strategic placement of error detectors. Finally, we followed up all presented techniques
in this dissertation work with an extensive set of experimental results demonstrating the
effectiveness of these techniques.
To summarize, through this dissertation work, we hope to make a tiny but significant
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enough contribution to the considerably vast area of system resilience. We believe the
quest for developing efficient resilience solutions is far from over. With ever evolving
transistor technology, new programming languages, architectures, and compiler tech-
nologies, there is an urgent need to keep a persistent effort towards developing efficient
resilience solutions targeting various system layers. Looking towards exascale computing
and beyond, we need a collection of resilience solutions at each system layer such that a
combination of best suited cross-layer solutions can be chosen guided by the requirements
of these massively parallel systems and the nature of applications running on it while
keeping in mind the cost and energy implications of these resilience solutions.
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